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ABSTRACT 
 
In 1966, the United Nations Legal Subcommittee drafted the widely 
accepted Outer Space Treaty to regulate the use and exploration of Outer 
Space. Following the Cold War and successful launch of the Russian 
Spacecraft Sputnik I in 1957, this treaty formed the preliminary framework 
for all the subsequent Outer Space Treaties, including the failed Moon 
Agreement, which attempted to detail the use of the Outer Space Resources.   
 
Although the Outer Space Treaty expressly precludes the ‘sovereign 
appropriation’ of the Moon and Other Celestial bodies, it remains unclear 
till today whether these exclusions extend to private ‘non-governmental’ 
entities. More importantly, the Outer Space Treaty fails to establish any 
positive property rights regime on the use of extra-celestial land or minerals 
in Outer Space. 
 
As the existing property rights regime on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies remains clouded by great uncertainty and ambiguity, there is an 
urgent need for reform. This thesis asks the fundamental question: Is the 
existing property rights regime effective in protecting the property rights 
asserted by private non-governmental entities in Outer Space? Rejecting the 
Common Heritage of Mankind concept adopted in the use and exploitation 
of the global commons, Antarctica and the Deep Seas, this paper critically 
re-evaluates the Grotius’ seminal work Mare Liberum (The Free Sea). 
Adopting a Lockean liberal stance on the common ownership and use of 
property, this paper will call for the implementation of a less restrictive 
private property rights regime applying a ‘new’ public trust doctrine.  
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EXTRA-TERRESTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
A COSMIC CATASTROPHE LURKING IN THE SIDELINES 
 
 
PERVEEN KAUR1 
I INTRODUCTION  
 
I’m an optimist.  
We will reach out to the stars. 
     Stephen Hawking2 
 
A Background  
 
For the longest time, the voyage into Outer Space, its infinite abyss of 
galaxies, stars, planets and asteroids, has been fueled by mankind’s 
insatiable appetite for discovering and conquering the ‘final frontier’.3 
While initial developments in Outer Space were pioneered by the States, 
recent developments in Space Exploration, suggest a subtle transition 
towards more extensive privately driven space initiatives.4 In the past 
decade, alone, private ‘non-governmental entities’ such as Planetary 
Resources and Mars One have expressed ambitious plans to exploit mineral 
resources in nearby asteroids and establish colonies in Outer Space, 
respectively.5 With a range of private actors from The Lunar Embassy6 to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  LLB (Hons) (Murdoch University), GDLP (Australian National University). I would 
like to  thank Dr Jürgen Bröhmer for his invaluable expertise, support and 
encouragement throughout this thesis. All errors remain my own.  
2  Roger Highfield, ‘Colonies in Space May be Only Hope, Says Hawking’, The 
Telegraph (online), 16 October 2001 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews 
/1359562/Colonies-in-space-may-be-only-hope-says-Hawking.html>. 
3  Arvind Jayaram, ‘A Space Odyssey’, The Straits Times (Singapore), 28 July 2015, 
12–3; David Shukman, ‘New Horizons: Why Bother Exploring the Solar System’, 
BBC (online), 18 July 2015 < http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-
33569565>; Biprorshee Das, ‘Billionaires and their Spaced-Out Projects’, The 
Economic Times (online), 30 July 2015 <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
magazines/panache/billionaires-and-their-spaced-out-
projects/articleshow/48277037.cms>. 
4  President Barrack Obama, ‘Remarks on the Space Program’ (Speech delivered at the 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida, 14 April 2010). <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/ 
16/science/space/16nasa _text.html>;  
5  Planetary Resources, Planetary Resources’ First Spacecraft Successfully Deployed, 
Testing Asteroid Prospecting Technology on Orbit (16 July 2015) 
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American entrepreneur, Dennis Hope,7 selling millions of plots on the 
Moon, Mars, and other celestial bodies for as low as US$19.99, this raises 
some interesting, albeit difficult questions: Can private ‘non-governmental’ 
entities assert legally valid claims on the surface and subsurface of the 
Moon and Other Celestial bodies without an overriding sovereign? If so, 
what amounts to a ‘legally valid’ claim?  
 
B Aim of Thesis  
 
While the right to property remains an inalienable right, predominantly 
embodied in natural law traditions and Article 17 of Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen,8 it remains grossly uncertain whether this 
fundamental right to property may extend to Outer Space. Although the 
Outer Space Treaty expressly precludes the ‘sovereign appropriation’ of the 
Moon and Other Celestial bodies,9 it remains unclear till today whether 
these exclusions extend to private ‘non-governmental’ entities. More 
importantly, the Outer Space Treaty fails to establish any positive property 
rights regime on the use of extraterrestrial land or minerals in Outer Space.10  
 
Despite extensive literature on the States’ inability to assert sovereignty in 
Outer Space, few studies have analysed whether private entities would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.planetaryresources.com/2015/07/planetary-resources-first-spacecraft-
deployed>; Rosa Silverman, ‘Life on Mars: When will Humans Live on the Red 
Planet’, The Telegraph (online), 18 July 2015 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
science/space/11746947/Life-on-Mars-when-will-humans-live-on-the-Red-Planet. 
html>. Other private companies interested in Outer Space mining include, Infinite 
Space Dynamics, Shackleton Energy Company, Moon Express, Deep Space 
Industries, Global Space Organisation, Stott Space Inc. The number of private entities 
with the ability to manufacture Outer Space Transport vehicles and Launch vehicles 
has also increased significantly in the recent years.  
6  Saskia Vermeylen, ‘Who Owns the Moon?’, The Guardian (online) 17 October 2014 
<http://www.the guardian.com/science/blog/2014/oct/17/who-owns-moon-land>. 
7   Ibid.  
8  Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 [Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen 1789] (France) art 17 (‘Declaration of the Rights of Man’).  
9  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 27 
January 1967, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 October 1967) art II (‘Outer 
Space Treaty’). 
10  Wayne N White, ‘Real Property Rights in Outer Space’ (Paper presented at the 40th 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1998) (‘Real Property Rights’). 
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able to assert private property rights, in a legal vacuum, without any 
overriding sovereign authority. The subtle distinction between private 
property rights ‘conferred’ by the sovereign and property rights merely 
‘recognised’ by the sovereign, remains relatively unexplored in the existing 
scholarly literature. Moreover, the epistemological foundations of property 
rights are rarely considered.  
 
Recognising the ambiguities plaguing the existing extraterrestrial property 
rights regime, this thesis aims to address some difficult, albeit fundamental, 
concerns by:  
(a) Identifying the need for ‘non-governmental’ entities to assert 
private property claims on the surface and subsurface11 of the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies;  
(b) Identifying and critically evaluating the existing property rights 
regime under the Outer Space Treaty,12 Moon Agreement13 and 
International Customary Practices;   
(c) Comparing existing Outer Space property regime with the other 
legal regimes governing the use of the global commons on Earth 
including Antarctica14 and the Deep Seas15 in search for a better 
system;  
(d) Making suggestions to clarify the operation of the ‘national non-
appropriation clause’,16 ‘province of mankind’17 doctrine and 
‘equitable use’18 of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  This includes structures attached to the surface of the Celestial body and resources 
found in its subsurface.  
12  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature on 
27 January 1967, 610 UNTS 205 (entered into force on 10 October 1967) (‘Outer 
Space Treaty’).  
13  Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Celestial Bodies, opened for 
signature on 18 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 11 July 1984) 
(‘Moon Agreement’). 
14  Antarctic Treaty opened for signature on 1 December 1959, 402 UNTS 71 (entered 
into force on 23 June 1961). 
15  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature on 10 
December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force on 16 November 1994) 
(‘UNCLOS’). 
16  Outer Space Treaty art 2. 
17  Ibid art 1. 
18  Moon Agreement art 11.  
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(e) Proposing a reform of the existing Outer Space property rights 
regime by calling for a ‘new’, less restrictive, public trust doctrine. 
 
C Structure and Methodology 
 
Adopting a doctrinal reform oriented methodology,19 this thesis contends 
that the existing Outer Space property rights regime is so uncertain and 
ambiguous that even if a private entity were to occupy the surface of a 
celestial body, it remains unclear whether this ‘act’ would constitute a 
‘legally valid’ claim under the Outer Space Treaty. Drawing on the 
terrestrial analogies of the Deep Seabed, Antarctica and the Arctic, this 
thesis proposes to critically evaluate the possibility of private property rights 
in land without any overriding sovereign. Lastly, recognising the significant 
impediment of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) doctrine to any 
future developments of the private property rights regime in Outer Space, 
this thesis advances a ‘new’ interpretation of communal property. By 
adopting the Lockean epistemology on property,20 this thesis critically re-
defines Hugo Grotius’ mare liberum.21 Admonishing the traditional 
conception of the CHM doctrine, and replacing it with the Lockean labour 
theory of property, this thesis ultimately advances a less restrictive legal 
regime by calling for a ‘new’ public trust regime where the ‘legal title’ is 
vested in the private entity, as the trustee, to hold the trial property for the 
benefit of ‘mankind’.  
 
In line with the Lockean theory of property, this thesis undertakes the 
mammoth task of re-construing the ‘benefit of mankind’ principle from an 
obligatory ‘profit sharing’ mechanism to the creation of new resources and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Darren Lenard Hutchinson, ‘New Complexity Theories: From Theoretical Innovation 
to Doctrinal Reform’ (2002) 71(2) University of Missouri Kansas City Law Review 
431, 440. 
20  John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government (1690) ch 5 (‘Second 
Treatise’). 
21  Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right which Belongs to the Dutch to 
Take Part in the East Indian Trade (R van Deman Mangoffin trans, Oxford 
University Press, 1916) 29 [trans of: Mare Liberum sive de iure quod Batavis 
Competit ad Indicana Commercia (first published 1609)]. 
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opportunities for ‘mankind’ as a whole. By relying on the less restrictive 
interpretation of the ‘benefit of mankind’ principle advanced in Locke’s 
labour theory of property, this thesis asserts that property bestowed upon 
mankind in common may be privately appropriated to enhance its ‘common 
stock’ as:  
[H]e that encloses land … [derives a greater utility] 
from ten acres, [than] he could have from a hundred left 
to nature, [and] may truly be said to give ninety acres to 
mankind.22 
 
Adopting a logical progression of ideas as detailed below, Part II and III of 
this thesis scrutinizes the ambiguities in the existing property rights regime 
and works of highly qualified publications, respectively. Part IV will 
critically assess the terrestrial regimes governing the high seas, Antarctica 
and Arctic in search for useful analogies for private property rights to be 
asserted in land without any overriding sovereign. Proposing a ‘new’ public 
trust doctrine to introduce greater certainty in the existing Outer Space 
property rights regime, Part V of this thesis, will critically re-examine the 
existing res communis nature of property in Outer Space. 
 
Part II — The Existing Property Rights Regime 
 
Part II of this thesis critically examines the sources of property rights in 
Outer Space including: 
(a) International Conventions and Treaties;  
(b) Customary International Law;  
(c) Generally recognised principles of law; and  
(d) Judicial decisions.23  
Adopting both a literal and originalist interpretation of the Outer Space 
Treaty (OST) and the Moon Agreement (MA), Part II of the thesis examines 
the scope and application of certain key provisions such as the ‘freedom 
principle’, ‘national appropriation principle’ and ‘State authorisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [37]. 
23  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38. 
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principle’ which may apply to private entities seeking to appropriate land 
and resources in Outer Space. Despite the lack of extensive judicial 
discourse on the validity of private property rights in Outer Space, three key 
cases in the Russian Courts (‘Bai’s Tempel 1’),24 USA Courts (Nemitz 
case)25 and Canadian Courts (Langevin case)26 are thoroughly analysed for 
clues on the viability of private property rights in Outer Space. Part II of the 
thesis claims that:  
(a)  the issue of private property rights remains largely undefined in 
the absence of clear treaty provisions and disparaging judicial 
literature;  
(b) the pre-existing ambiguities must be resolved before the 
commercialisation of Outer Space begins; and  
(c)  private property rights may be permissible in Outer Space in the 
absence of any recognisable laws if the controversial ‘residual 
negative’ rule applied. 
 
Part III — From Martian to Lunar Real Estate: Are Private Entities 
Capable of Asserting Property Rights in Outer Space? 
 
To overcome the ambiguity in the existing legal regime, Part III of this 
thesis, critically evaluates the scarce, albeit diametrically opposite 
arguments advanced in works of highly qualified publications. Three 
commonly held views are scrutinised and critically evaluated. These include 
the strong, a forori, arguments: 
(a)  forbidding private property rights in Outer Space;  
(b)  promoting a full set of private property rights in Outer Space; and  
(c)  promoting a valid, albeit unrecognisable, property right in Outer 
Space.  
Rejecting the arguments on both ends of the spectrum, this chapter asserts 
that the functional property rights may serve as the most accurate depiction 
of private property rights under the existing regime. In other words, this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Artyom Liss, ‘Russian Sues Nasa for Comet Upset’, BBC (online), 4 July 2005 < 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4649987.stm>.   
25  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004). 
26  Re Langevin [2012] QCCS 613 (Superior Court of Québec). 
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chapter will assert that real property rights in Outer Space may only be 
asserted within a ‘facility’ such as a ‘space station’ attached to the surface or 
subsurface of the extraterrestrial body. 
 
Part IV — Terrestrial Property Rights: Lessons from Antarctica, The 
Deep Seabed and the Arctic  
 
Part IV of this thesis will critically examine the development of the private 
property rights regime in resource rich territories with non-existent claims 
of sovereign. While the deep seabed and Antarctica, serve as logical 
comparisons for future developments of private property rights in 
communal property such as Outer Space, the Arctic islands of Jan Mayen, 
Spitzbergen and Sverdrup offer unique analogies for the recognition of 
private property rights in land without a sovereign. Part IV of the thesis will 
raise two fundamental claims that:  
(a)  a simple cut and paste regime would be inappropriate to fit into the 
lex specialis of Space law; and  
(b)  private property claims asserted in land without a sovereign, is 
likely to be recognised subsequently, at a later date.  
 
Part V — The Solution: Overcoming an Unworkable Property Rights 
Regime 
 
Part V of this thesis examines the nature of property in Outer Space, namely 
whether the Moon and other celestial bodies are terra nullius territory, 
available for anyone to appropriate on a first come first served basis, or terra 
communis and therefore incapable of private appropriation. Expanding on 
the limitations of the CHM doctrine, Part V of the thesis will claim that:  
(a)  application of the CHM doctrine may lead to the over-exploitation 
of land and resources in Outer Space, a problem commonly known 
as the tragedy of the global commons; 
(b)  the ‘free access’ provision suggested by Hugo Grotius needs to be 
re-valuated using a Lockean epistemology;  
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(c)  property bestowed upon man in common need not remain 
communal property as evidenced in the 19th century homesteading 
movement in the USA; and 
(d)  a ‘new’ public trust doctrine must be superimposed onto the Outer 
Space legal regime to avoid any pre-existing ambiguities.  
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II THE EXISTING PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME 
 
On the Moon … or any other planets  
… apart from the laws of ‘Head Cheese’, currently no law exists 
The Lunar Embassy27 
A Sources of Property Rights in Outer Space  
 
At a cursory glance, Public International Law may be arbitrarily dismissed 
for having little utility in ‘private property rights’ which remains largely 
entrenched in municipal or domestic laws.28 Nevertheless, a detailed 
analysis may reveal otherwise.29 While lacking the intention of dealing with 
affairs beyond the State, Public International Law, may nevertheless, have 
the ‘capacity’ to govern private property rights.30 This is best illustrated by 
the jus cogens, preemptory norm, that prohibits slavery and by its extension, 
ownership of a person.31 Public International Law has always considered 
property rights in conventions ranging from the Vienna Convention on the 
Succession of the States32 to the use and appropriation of resources in the 
global commons.33  Hence, pursuant to Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the following sources of law may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Lunar Embassy, Extraterrestrial Property and Space Law: Fact and Fiction 
<http://lunarembassy.com/current-space-law>.  
28 Virgiliu Pop, Who Owns the Moon: Extraterrestrial Aspects of Land and Mineral 
Resources Ownership (Springer, 2008) 36 (‘The Moon’). Public International Law 
conventionally deals with interactions between States, rather than, the affairs of 
private individuals. See especially Blake Gilson, ‘Defending Your Client’s Property 
Rights in Space: A Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator’ (2011) 80 Fordham Law 
Review 1367 for a thorough comparison of the civil law and common law traditions of 
property.  
29 Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 35–6. Public International Law may be useful as a 
‘quasi-municipal law’ for property on the Moon and other Celestial bodies. 
30 Ibid 36.  
31 ‘Report by Mr H Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur’ (1953) II Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 90, 154–5; Slavery Convention, signed on 25 
September 1926, 60 UNTS 253 (entered into force 9 March 1927) art 1(1) states that 
‘[s]lavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. 
32 Vienna Convention on the Succession of the States in Respect to State Property, 
Archives and Debts, opened for signature 8 April 1983, 22 ILM 306 (not yet in force). 
33 Antarctic Treaty art IX; UNCLOS art 137. 
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regarded as useful in establishing the existing property rights regime in 
Outer Space:  
(a) International Conventions;  
(b) Customary International Law;  
(c) Judicial decisions; and  
(d) Highly qualified publications.34  
B International Treaty Provisions 
1 The Outer Space Treaty  
 
The Outer Space Treaty (OST),35 remains a monumental treaty commonly 
regarded as the constitution of the Corpus Juris Specialis.36 Developed in an 
era following the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s launch of the world’s 
first satellite, Sputnik 1,37 the OST sought to promote the peaceful use and 
exploration of Outer Space amongst States, especially Russia and the United 
States of America (USA), which were the only two ‘superpowers’ with the 
ability and willingness to fuel space research.38 While the Ad Hoc 
Committee39 dealt with matters ranging from mankind’s peaceful use and 
exploration of Outer Space to affording all States opportunities to benefit 
equally regardless of their ‘stage of economic development’,40 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38. While the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) only has jurisdiction to hear disputes between state parties, article 38 of 
the Statute of the ICJ nevertheless offers a promising start to consider the sources of 
International Law that apply to Outer Space. 
35  Outer Space Treaty arts I, II, VI. 
36  Fabio Tronchetti, The Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies: A Proposal for a Legal Regime (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 19; C Q 
Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space (Pergamon Press, 1982) 21; 
Bin Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 20; S B 
Rosenfield, ‘A Moon Treaty? Yes, but Why Now?’ (Paper presented at the 23rd 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1980) 69–72. 
37  Tronchetti, above n 36.   
38 BBC, About Sputnik 1 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/space/solarsystem/space_ 
missions/sputnik_1>.  
39  The Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was established by the 
General Assembly resolution, 1348 (XII), passed on 13 December 1958. See 
Tronchetti, above n 36, 14–8 for detailed discussions on the historical developments 
and debates by the legal subcommittee in Outer Space.  
40  International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 1st 
Comm, 14th sess, 856th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/1472(XIV)A (12 December 1959); 
International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 1st 
Comm, 16th sess, 1085th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/1721(XVI) A–E (20 December 
1961); Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
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exploitation of extraterrestrial resources was left to be tackled at a later date 
when it became a possibility.41  
 
As the appropriation of surface and subsurface of the Moon and Other 
Celestial bodies remained an unfathomable phenomenon during the early 
negotiations of the OST, most of the provisions of the OST deal specifically 
with the State’s ability to explore and use Outer Space.42 The provisions 
dealing specifically with extraterrestrial property rights remain extremely 
scarce.43 Nevertheless, Article I (‘The Freedom Principle’),44 Article II 
(‘The Non-Appropriation Principle’)45 and Article VI (‘State’s 
Responsibility for Private Entities in Outer Space’)46 of the OST, may 
provide some valuable insight on the commercial ‘use’ and ‘exploitation’ of 
extraterrestrial land and resources by private non-governmental entities.47  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 1st Comm, 18th sess, 1280th plen 
mtg, UN Doc A/RES/1962(XVIII) (13 December 1963). The United Nations’ 1962 
Resolution (XVIII) and the OST provisions remain identical. Countries such as the 
United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom drafted proposals which formed the 
groundwork for regulation of activities in Outer Space. 
41  Tronchetti, above n 36, 10; Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 37; M A Ferrer, 
‘Introductory Report on Activities on Celestial Bodies and the Exploitation of Natural 
Resources’ (Paper presented at the 12th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 
1969) 141, 144; L Szaloky, ‘The Way of the Further Perfection of the Legal 
Regulation Concerning the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies’ (Paper presented at the 
16th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1974) 196, 197; Q He, ‘The Outer 
Space Treaty in Perspective’ (Paper presented at the 40th Colloquium on the Law of 
Outer Space, 1997) 51, 52. 
42  N Jasentuliyana, ‘Article I of the Outer Space Treaty Revisited’ (1989) 17 Journal of 
Space Law 129, 141 (‘Article I Revisited’). Note, however, that Article VI of the OST 
imposes an obligation on States to regulate the activities of private non-governmental 
entities in Outer Space. For a more detailed analysis of Article VI refer to the heading 
‘State’s Responsibility for the Actions of Nationals’, below. 
43  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 37. 
44  Outer Space Treaty art I. 
45  Ibid art II. 
46  Ibid art VI. 
47  Ricky Lee, Law and Regulations of Commercial Mining of Minerals in Outer Space 
(Springer, 2012) 153–71 (‘Commercial Mining’).  
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(a) The Freedom Principle  
 
Pursuant to Article I of the OST:  
 
The exploration and use of outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies shall be carried out for 
the benefit and in the interests of all countries … and 
shall be the province of all mankind.48  
 
As renowned space law scholar, Jasentuliyana, contended that the objective 
of Article I explicitly calls for the ‘use’49 and exploration of Outer Space for 
the ‘benefit’ and ‘interest’ of all States to meet the ‘essential needs of 
mankind’.50 While the provision expressly promotes co-operation amongst 
States,51 it remains largely unclear how this provision would apply to non-
governmental entities, which are often not susceptible to ‘strict regulatory 
control’ by States.52 The definition and scope of the ‘province of mankind’ 
concept, alone, remains a highly debated issue amongst legal scholars for 
more than three decades before retiring to the question of political 
discourse.53 Nevertheless, the vague construction of Article I begs the 
question whether it serves merely as a moral obligation or a legally 
recognised obligation in law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Outer Space Treaty art I. 
49  Hanneke L Van Traa-Engelman, Commercial Utilization of Outer Space: Law and 
Practice (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993) 17, 20–1; S B Rosenfield, ‘Use in 
Economic Development in Outer Space’ (Paper presented at the 24th Colloquium on 
the Law of Outer Space, 1981) 73–7; Nadasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy Lee (eds), 
Manual on Space Law (Oceana Publications, 1979) 1, 11 (‘Manual of Space Law’). 
The term ‘use’ extends to the commercial exploitation of extraterrestrial land and its 
resources. During the early discussions on the Outer Space Treaty, a significant 
number of delegates agreed with the expansive interpretation of the term ‘use’ to also 
include ‘exploitation’. The French delegate even asserted that the exploitation of 
natural resources on the Moon as falling within the ‘use’ and ‘exploration’ of Outer 
Space.  
50  Jasentuliyana, Article I Revisited, above n 42, 139–40. 
51  Ibid 141. 
52  Ibid. 
53  J I Gabrynowicz, ‘The Province and Heritage of Mankind Recognised a New 
Beginning’ (Paper presented at the 2nd Conference on Lunar Bases and Space 
Activities, Houston, April 1988) 691, 692. Recognising the absence of an exact 
definition and scope of ‘ the mankind provision’, Gabrynowicz, aptly summarises this 
struggle as ‘space lawyers … arguing the number of angels that can sit on the head of 
the pin’ without the requisite political will.  
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Although scholars such as Bin Cheng contend that Article I of the OST 
serves as nothing more than a declaratory provision lacking any legal 
effect,54 others assert that the deliberate use of the word ‘interests’, rather 
than ‘interest’, is sufficient to impose ‘specific’ and ‘identifiable’ 
obligations.55  Nevertheless, even if it is found that Article I imposes a 
positive obligation to carry out activities in the ‘interests of all countries’, it 
remains unlikely that it would be interpreted to expressly exclude ‘use’ and 
‘exploitation’ of Outer Space by private non-governmental entities.56 While 
defining the exact ‘interest of all countries’ remains a problematic question 
of policy, it is likely that all private property claims on the surface and 
subsurface of extraterrestrial bodies may be regarded as:  
(a)  Unlawfully benefiting only some countries;57  
(b) Unlawful unless the profits of the commercial ventures are 
distributed to all States without incurring corresponding costs;58 
(c)  Lawfully providing a non-discriminatory system for the purchase 
of the resources by other States and private entities;59 and  
(d)  Lawful unless its ‘use’ of the extraterrestrial surface and its 
resources precludes others from doing the same.60 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Bin Cheng, ‘The 1967 Space Treaty’ (1968) 95 Journal du Droit International 532; D 
Goedhuis, ‘Some Legal Problems Arising from the Utilisation of Outer Space’ (Paper 
Presented at the 54th Conference, Hague, August 1970) 434. 
55  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 160–2.   
56  Ibid 161. C Q Christol, ‘The Amercian Bar Association and the 1979 Moon Treaty: 
The Search for a Position’ (1981) 9 Journal of Space Law 77; Martin Menter, 
‘Commercial Space Activities Under the Moon Treaty’ (1979) 7 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 213, 220. The obligatory nature of Article I of the 
Outer Space Treaty remains largely unaccepted amongst leading space law scholars 
and academics.  
57  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 161. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid.  
60  Ibid. 
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(b) The Non Appropriation Principle  
 
Despite warranting only ‘a few minutes’ of discussions by the drafters, 
Article II of the OST,61 remains one of the most contentious provisions 
amongst the existing space law academics.62 Article II of the OST expressly 
stipulates:  
 
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial 
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim 
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by 
any other means.  
 
As the OST failed to provide any clear definition of the term ‘national 
appropriation’ and ‘by any other means’63 in the OST, Article II remained 
susceptible to numerous conflicting interpretations.64 It continues to be 
largely unclear whether Article II of the OST would prevent private non-
governmental entities from asserting private property rights in Outer 
Space.65  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  Jasentuliyana and Lee, Manual on Space Law, above n 49. 
62  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10; Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, ‘Space 
Settlements, Property Rights and International Law: Could a Lunar Settlement Claim 
the Lunar Real Estate it Needs to Survive’ (2008) 73 Journal on Air Law and 
Commerce 37; Thomas Gangale, The Development of Outer Space: Sovereignty and 
Property Rights in International Law (Greenwood Publishing, 2009); Jijo George 
Cherian and Job Abraham, ‘Concept of Private Property in Space: An Analysis’ 
(2007) 2(4) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 211, 213. Jijo 
and Job, for example, suggest that the ambiguity surrounding Article II serves as a 
major impediment to the recognition of private property rights in Outer Space.  
63  See especially Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 177–8 for a detailed discussion 
on the phrase ‘by other means’. The use of the phrase ‘by any other means’ must not 
be mistaken as an all-encompassing residuary provision which prohibits private 
property rights in Outer Space. Manfred Lachs, The Law of Outer Space: An 
Experience in Contemporary Law Making (Sijthoff, 1972) 43. While Lachs contends 
that the phrase ‘by any other means’ prevented States from establishing a title by 
discovering, bordering or establishing some form of proximity with the 
extraterrestrial property. Ivan A Vlasic, ‘The Space Treaty: A Preliminary Evaluation’ 
(1967) 5 California Law Review 512.  
64   Summary Record of the 71st Meeting, UN GAOR, 5th sess, 71st mtg, UN Doc 
A/AC.105/C.2/SR.71 (21 October 1966) 15–6; S Gorove, ‘Interpreting Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty’ (1969) 37 Fordham Law Review 349 (‘Interpreting Article 
II’).  Gorove expounds on three key uncertainties in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty including the lack of defined boundaries between airspace and outer space, the 
impact of the national non-appropriation principle on private entities and the 
undefined scope of ‘appropriation’ concept. 
65  Jijo and Job, above n 62.  
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While advocates of space law, such as Wasser, favour a literal 
interpretation of the Article II, relying heavily on its failure to expressly 
exclude the phrase ‘private appropriation’,66 others warn against reading 
the provision in isolation.67 Subscribers of the latter school of thought 
argue that the analogy of private entities being ‘controlled’ and 
‘supervised’ by the State automatically amounts to an act of ‘national 
appropriation’ and therefore precluded by Article II of the OST.68 A 
detailed analysis of the drafters’ intentions in the travaux préparatoire, on 
the other hand, suggests a deliberate exclusion of the phrase ‘by human 
activity’.69  
 
Nevertheless, it remains highly uncertain whether the term ‘national 
appropriation’ merely translates to ‘national sovereignty’ or is capable of a 
wider interpretation to exclude private property rights in Outer Space. A 
similar exclusionary provision adopted in Article 137 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), suggests a subtle, albeit 
important, distinction between the term ‘appropriation’ and ‘sovereignty’.70 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62; Carl Q Christol, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind 
Provision in the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and 
Other Celestial Bodies’ (1980) 14 The International Lawyer 429, 448 (‘The CHM 
Provision’); Gorove, Interpreting Article II, above n 64, 351. Drawing on Article 
11(3) of the Moon Agreement, which expressly precludes private non-governmental 
entities from asserting exclusive property rights on the surface and subsurface of the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, Christol suggests that Article II is distinct. Christol 
and Gorove further contend that the term ‘national appropriation’ must not be 
mistaken for preventing private property rights asserted in Outer Space. 
67  Leslie Tennen, ‘Emerging System of Property Rights in Outer Space’ (Paper 
presented at the United Nations Workshop on Space Law, Republic of Korea, 2003) 
342 (‘Emerging Systems’); Leslie Tennen, ‘Outer Space: A Preserve for All Mankind’ 
(1979) 2 Houston Journal of International Law 145, 149 (‘A Preserve for All 
Mankind’). Tennen opposes reading Article II of the Outer Space Treaty in isolation. 
Relying primarily on the arguement that private entities are ‘controlled’ and 
‘supervised’ by the State, Tennen concludes that all their activities automatically 
amount to an act of ‘national appropriation’ precluded by Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty.   
68  Ibid. See also Outer Space Treaty art VI.  
69  Jasentuliyana and Lee, Manual on Space Law, above n 49; Ricky Lee, ‘Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty’ (2004) 11 Australian International Law Journal 128, 134 
(‘Article II of the OST’). Despite the Soveit delegate’s initial proposal to add the 
phrase ‘by human activity’, this was never expressly adopted in the Outer Space 
Treaty marking a deliberate refusal by the States to prohibit ‘private appropriation’ in 
Outer Space. 
70  Cf Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 169. Lee suggests that both the ‘national 
appropriation’ and ‘national sovereignty’ phrases are identical in its application. 
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Pursuant to Article 137 of the UNCLOS, while States cannot assert 
‘sovereignty’ on any part of the deep seabed or its resources, both the State 
and private entities71 are prohibited from ‘appropriating’ any part of the 
deep seabed.72 Although the ability to assert territorial sovereignty applies 
exclusively to States,73 customary international law recognises that both 
States and private entities have the ability to ‘appropriate’ land by 
establishing ‘title’ or ‘exclusive’ possession.74  
 
In the absence of more, it may be reasonable to conclude that the phrase 
‘national appropriation’ in Article II of the OST implies nothing more than 
an ‘exercise of territorial sovereignty’ by States in Outer Space.75 As 
Stevenson, a delegate representing USA, contended that the national 
appropriation principle applying to States should not extend to private 
entities as:  
 
Freedom of space and of celestial bodies, like the 
freedom of the seas … [implies that] man should be free 
to venture into space without any restraints except those 
imposed by the laws of his own nation and by 
international law, including the United Nations 
Charter.76 
 
On the contrary, it remains equally unlikely that the limitations placed on 
sovereign States would automatically translate to private entities by virtue 
of their ‘citizenship’ or place of incorporation.77 While claims of 
extraterrestrial land are governed by the lex situs of Outer Space, resources 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71  Private entities include both natural and juridical persons.  
72  UNCLOS art 137. Pursuant to article 137 of UNCLOS, the appropriation of the deep 
seas by any State or juridical person remains prohibited. 
73  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 169.  
74  Gorove, Interpreting Article II, above n 64, 351; White, Real Property Rights, above n 
10. 
75  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 169. 
76  Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 1st Comm, 
16th sess, 1210th mtg, Agenda Item 21, UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1210 (4 December 1961) 
[4]. Stevenson contended that although it was in the best interest to prevent national 
appropriation by States, he proclaimed that men, on the other hand should not be 
subject to similar restrictions.   
77  Wayne White, ‘Nemitz vs US: The First Real Property Case in United States Courts’ 
(Paper presented at the 47th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 2005); Jijo and 
Job, above n 62, 213. 
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extracted from the Moon and other celestial bodies are likely to be 
governed by the lex domicili of the private entity responsible for extracting 
the resources.78As the laws governing property rights depend on the 
‘location’ of the property, any claims of extraterrestrial land would have to 
be recognised by extraterrestrial laws.79 The extraction of resources, 
however, flows from the laws governing the private entity’s permanent 
legal residence or place of origin.80 As C Sweet succinctly suggests 
minerals, ‘[w]hile unsevered, … from part of the land, and as such are real 
estate. When severed they become personal chattels’.81  
 
The traditional rule of potestas finitus ubi fini tur armorum vis, commonly 
known as the ‘cannon shot rule’ implies that the concept of sovereignty has 
always been subject to spatial limitations.82 While the exact vertical limits 
of sovereignty remains a highly contentious issue amongst space law 
scholars, most agree that all claims of sovereignty by nations end at the 
boundary where ‘air space’ transitions into ‘outer space’.83 As the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, unlike geostationary orbits, do not fall directly 
above any one State, or group of States, it is ‘ludicrous’ to suggest that the 
activities of private entities would automatically amount to ‘sovereign 
appropriation’ which remains prohibited by Article II of the OST.84 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  Virgiliu Pop, ‘The Property Status of Lunar Resources’ in Voriel Badescu (ed), 
Moon: Prospective Energy and Material Resources (Springer, 2012) 553, 557 (‘The 
Property Status’); Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 36. 
79  Ibid. 
80  Ibid. 
81   C Sweet, A Dictionary of English Law (Sweet, 1882) 259; See also Pop, The Property 
Status, above n 78. 
82  James Crawford (ed), Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 256.  
83  Convention on International Aviation, opened for signature 7 December 1944, 15 
UNTS 295 (entered into force 4 April 1947) (‘Chicago Convention’). Pursuant to the 
Chicago Convention, the airspace above a particular State falls exclusively under its 
sovereignty. See, eg, Stanley B Rosenfield, ‘Where Air Space Ends and Outer Space 
Begins’ (1979) 7 Journal of Space Law 137, 139–40; Gbenga Oduntan, ‘The Never 
Ending Dispute: Legal Theories on the Spatial Demarcation Boundary Plane Between 
Airspace and Outer Space’ (2003) 1 Hertfordshire Law Journal 64, 79–80; Steven 
Freeland, ‘Fly Me to the Moon: How Will International Law Cope with Commercial 
Space Tourism?’ (2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law 90, 101.  
84  Michael J Finch, ‘Limited Space: Allocating the Geostationary Orbit’ (1985) 7 
Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business 788, 790–1; Declaration of 
the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries (adopted on 3 December 1997) ITU Doc 
WARC-BS-81-E (‘Bogotá Declaration’). The Bogotá Declaration was created when 
eight equatorial States grouped together to assert sovereignty on the geostationary 
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(c) States’ Responsibility for Private Acts  
 
Article VI of the OST imposes a positive obligation on States to ‘authorise’ 
and ‘supervise’ the activities carried out by private, non-governmental 
entities in Outer Space.85 Some renowned space law scholars, such as 
Jasentuliyana contend that Article VI of the OST imposes a minimum 
obligation for private entities to abide by governmental imposed 
regulations.86 Calling for a State regulated licensing scheme, Jasentuliyana 
further suggests that unregulated private activities must be strictly 
prohibited even if it becomes a common occurrence in the near future.87  
 
A similar approach is adopted by Kerrest who suggests that: 
  
‘States have personal jurisdiction over their nationals  
… must keep the capacity to implement international 
law in general and space law in particular to make it 
applicable to their citizens’88  
 
This interpretation is particularly problematic, as it remains largely 
impossible to define the exact scope of a State’s obligations amidst the 
ambiguous treaty provisions.89 Moreover, it remains practically impossible 
to enforce State legislation on a foreign domiciled national engaging in 
space activities.90 Pursuant to the doctrine of State responsibility, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
orbit directly above them. Nevertheless, this deliberate attempt to assert sovereignty 
on the geostationary orbit was dismissed in International Law. 
85  Outer Space Treaty art VI on State responsibility stipulates that:  
 State Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are 
carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring 
that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the 
present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision 
by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organisation, 
responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne by the international 
organisation and by the State Parties to the Treaty participating in such organisation.  
86  Jasentuliyana and Lee, Manual on Space Law, above n 49, 17. 
87  Ibid. 
88  Armel Kerrest, ‘Commercial Use of Space, Including Launching’ (Paper presented at 
the Space Law Conference, China Institute of Space Law, 2004) 199. 
89  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 130–3.  
90  Ibid 132. 
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activities of private non-governmental entities may constitute an ‘act of a 
State’ if it is:  
(a) Expressly sanctioned by the government (Article 5);91  
(b) Directed and controlled by the State (Article 8);92 or   
(c) Expressly adopted and recognised by the State as its own (Article 
11).93 
 
As a ‘general conception of the law’, the doctrine of State responsibility, 
imposes a positive obligation on States to make reparation for failing to 
adhere by its international obligations.94 For example, in Hyatt 
International Corporation v Iran,95 the tribunal held that the expropriations 
of a foundation, ‘established’ and sanctioned by the government to identify 
property for seizure, imposed a liability on the State.96 If the right to 
property is defined as a positive right granted by the sovereign,97 any 
recognition of property rights by private but State empowered entities, 
similar to the East India Company,98 may be regarded as an ‘act of a State’ 
prohibited by the national non-appropriation principle (‘Article II’) 
discussed above. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility as contained in ILC, Report of the 
International Law Commission on the Work of its 53rd Session, UN Doc A/56/10 
(2001) art 5 (‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’).  
92  Ibid art 8. 
93  Ibid art 11. 
94  Chorzów Factory (Merits) (Germany v Poland) [1928] PCIJ (ser A), No 17, 29. 
Pursuant to the State responsibility principle:  
 any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make reparation … the Court has 
already said that reparation is the indispensible complement of a failure to apply a 
convention, and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. 
95  Hyatt International v Iran (Interlocutory Award) (1985) 9 CT Rep 72, 88–94. 
96  Ibid. ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, above n 91. The ‘power of 
detention’, ‘immigration control or quarantine’ are powers that innately rests with the 
State. If these powers are delegated to private entities under State legislation, the State 
remains liable for the breaches which may ensue. James Crawford, The International 
Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and 
Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 100. Crawford suggests that the 
State may be equally responsible for ‘quasi-public’ or ‘private entities’ created or 
governed by State laws.   
97  Janice Toner, ‘Property Rights: An Analysis of their Implications for Understanding 
Land Rights in Australia’ (2009) 1 Extension Farming Systems Journal 79, 80–1.  
98  Stephen D Krasner, ‘Sovereignty’ (2001) 122 Foreign Policy 20; Jasentuliyana and 
Lee, Manual on Space Law, above n 49, 17. States may not use the privatisation of 
national appropriation activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies to avoid its 
international obligations under the existing Outer Space Treaty.   
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Prima facie, Article VI of the OST may be taken to mistakenly equate 
private property rights as an ‘act of the State’ requiring the ‘authorisation’ 
and ‘control’ of the State.99 State control, in itself, imposes an onerous 
burden that may often be difficult to establish.100 As illustrated in the 
Nacaragua case, a State must impose both ‘actual’ and ‘effective’ control 
over the actions of a private entity to satisfy the requirement of State 
control.101  Even if a lower threshold is adopted, similar to the recent Tadic 
case,102 it is unlikely that ‘mere financing and equipping … participat[ing] 
in planning and supervision’ would be sufficient to establish the requisite 
'control'.103 
 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) financial 
grants104 and assistance105 to private entities, for example, fail to satisfy the 
lower standards of ‘State control’. In the absence of express State 
legislation ‘controlling’ or ‘authorising’ private property claims in Outer 
Space, even the acts of wholly private entities, such as the Archimedes 
Institute asserting State like powers by maintaining a registry of property 
claims in Outer Space, is unlikely to establish the requisite nexus to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99  Tennen, Emerging Systems, above n 67. In forwarding this argument, Tennen 
strongly opposes reading Article II of the Outer Space Treaty in isolation without 
considering the obligation of states to ‘authorise’ and ‘control’ private activities in 
Outer Space.  
100  Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, ‘The Doctrine of State Responsibility as a Potential 
Means for Holding Private Actors Accountable for Human Rights’ (2004) 5 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 7. 
101  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United 
States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua Case’) 62–4. In the 
Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice held that the state had imposed 
obligations on some of the paramilitary operations being carried out by a private 
entity. 
102  Prosecutor v Tadic (Appeals Chamber Judgment) Case No 94-IT-1-T (15 July 1999), 
38 ILM 1518 (‘Tadic Case’). The requisite level of ‘control’ may vary according to 
the facts of the case. 
103  Ibid [145].  
104  National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Commercial Crew and Cargo 
<http://www.nasa.gov/offices/c3po/partners/ccdev_info.html>. NASA has provided 
four private entities financial grants to assist them in the development of commercial 
space activities including the development of spaceships which may launch humans 
into outer space. 
105  Paul Marks, ‘Lunar Law Row Hots up as NASA Enters Private Moon Rush’, New 
Scientist (online) 5 February 2014 < 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22129552-700-lunar-law-row-hots-up-as-
nasa-enters-private-moon-rush/>. As part of the Cargo Transportation and Landing by 
Soft Touchdown program, NASA allowed the use of its labs, scientists and software 
by private non-governmental entities intending to establish a presence in Outer Space. 
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constitute an ‘act of the State’.106  Moreover, it remains equally unlikely for 
States to issue decrees in support of the assertion of private property rights 
in Outer Space.107  
 
2 The Moon Agreement  
 
Although the Moon Agreement108 failed to secure widespread acceptance 
amongst the international community, academics such as Galloway and 
Gorove highlight its utility in clarifying the interpretation of Article II of the 
OST.109 Despite its remarkable resemblance with ‘national non-
appropriation’ principle in Article II of the OST, Article 11(3) of the Moon 
agreement provides an additional requirement that:  
 
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor 
… natural resources  .. shall become the property of any 
State, intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organisation … non-governmental entity or of any 
natural person110 
 
Prima facie, Article 11(3) imposes a positive obligation on private ‘non-
governmental entities’ against asserting any property rights on the Moon. 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether the application of this provision is 
spatially limited to apply only to the Moon or extends to other celestial 
bodies such as Mars and other nearby asteroids.111 Moreover, some leading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10, 171–2; Chirwa, above n 100, 9. 
107  See Diplomatic and Consular Staff Case (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ 
Rep 3. The International Court of Justice held that the acts of militants, expressly 
approved by a decree issued by the Government, was sufficient to impose 
responsibility on the State. 
108  Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies, opened for signature 5 December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3 (entered into force 11 
July 1984) (‘Moon Agreement’). 
109  E Galloway, ‘Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies’ (1980) 5 Annals Air and Space Law 481, 498–9; Gorove, 
Interpreting Article II, above n 64. 
110  Moon Agreement art 11; Lee, Article II of the OST, above n 69, 131–2. 
111  Nicolas M Matte, ‘Treaty Relating to the Moon’ in Nadasiri Jasentuliyana and Roy 
Lee (eds), Manual on Space Law (Oceana Publications, 1979) 253, 257. While some 
States such as the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Egypt, France and Japan contended 
that the application of the Moon Agreement remained limited to the Moon, others 
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space law academics such as Gorove,112 Christol113 and Lee114 contend that 
Article 11(3) of the Moon Agreement may be used to suggest that the 
‘national appropriation’ provision in the OST (Article II) was never 
intended to constitute ‘an all-inclusive’ phrase.  	  
C Customary International Law 	  
It is largely acknowledged that the freedom of use and exploration principle 
(Article I), national appropriation principle (Article II) and State 
responsibility principle (Article VI) form a widely accepted customary 
international law as it has been ratified by a significant number of States and 
even States who are not parties to the treaty.115 The OST treaty has been 
‘accepted’ and ‘recognised’ by a significant number of States as a form of 
customary international law.116 Some space law scholars such as Qizhi He, 
suggest that the principles found in the OST crystallised into international 
customary norms even before the conclusion of the treaty.117 Although the 
process of creating customary international law is usually inverted,118 the 
extensive State compliance of the United Nations Space Resolutions 
reaffirms the proposition that the OST merely codified and enhanced these 
pre-existing principles of customary international law.119 Despite this, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Belgium, Romanian 
and Iran favoured the extension of the treaty to all celestial bodies.  
112  Gorove, Interpreting Article II, above n 64. 
113  Christol, above n 66, 437. 
114  Lee, Article II of the OST, above n 69, 131–2. 
115  Ibid 126. Cheng, Studies In International Space Law, above n 36, ch 7; N M Matte, 
Space Activities And Emerging International Law (McGill University, 1984) 318.  
116  Zachos A Paliouras, ‘The Non-Appropriation Principle’ (2014) 27(1) Leiden Journal 
of International Law 37. Paliouras contends that the ‘non-appropriation’ principle 
found in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty remains a Grundnorm of Space Law. 
Expounding on the acquisition of property by States, Paliouras futher contends that 
previously unoccupied territories may be claimed by ‘occupation’.   Cheng, Studies In 
International Space Law, above n 36, ch 7; Gennady M Danilenko, ‘International Jus 
Cogens: Issues of Law-Making’ (1991) 2 European Journal of International Law 42, 
55. Danilenko suggests that the principles of International Law may be regarded as 
jus cogen if it forms a norm ‘accepted and recognised … by the international 
community of States as a whole’. Cf Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 113. 
117  Q He, ‘The Outer Space Treaty in Perspective’ (Paper presented at the 40th 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1997) 51, 53–4.  
118  F Lyall, ‘On the Moon’ (1998) 26 Journal of Space Law 129, 131. 
119  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 38; Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38. 
The ICJ defines international custom as the ‘general practice accepted [in] law’. 
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provisions of the Moon Agreement, ratified by a mere 13 States, may not be 
afforded the same status of jus cogens.120   
 
Nevertheless, the provisions of the OST must not be regarded as 
‘immutable’.121 It remained evident from the early discussions with the 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) 
that a ‘comprehensive legal code may not be appropriate’.122 In its place, a 
‘progressive approach’ was preferred to give effect to the advancements in 
Space technology.123 As Jereicho and McCracken fervently contend, space 
law has the potential to ‘become more specific … [and give effect to] the 
international commercial aspects of man’s space endeavors’.124  
 
Although a new treaty may be enacted before it is technologically possible 
to assert property rights in Outer Space, the development of ‘customary law’ 
relies on ‘actual practice’.125 As the appropriation of Outer Space remains a 
distant reality, scholars such as Paxson contend that the OST should serve 
as the ‘first source of international law’ in Outer Space.126 Nevertheless, the 
distinction between ‘customary law’ and ‘treaty’ remains arbitrary as both 
have the potential to expand and evolve with the exploration and use of 
outer space. 127 Even if the provisions of the OST were regarded as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120  Kurt A Baca, ‘Property Rights in Outer Space’ (1993) 58 Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 1041, 1068. Baca argues that it may not be ‘credible’ to accord the 
provisions of the Moon Treaty with the status of jus cogens. Cf Pop, The Moon, 
above n 28, 38. Pop suggests that some norms of the Moon Agreement, including the 
use of samples derived from Outer Space, may be regarded as Customary 
International Law. 
121  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 39. 
122  Vladmir Kopal, ‘The Role of United Nations Declarations of Principles in the 
Progressive Development of Space Law’ (1998) 16 Journal of Space Law 5, 6.  
123  Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN GAOR, 
14th sess, 3rd pt, UN Doc A/4141 (14 July 1959). 
124  Eugene Jaricho and David G McCracken, ‘Space Law: Is it the Last Legal Frontiers?’ 
(1985) 51 Journal of Air Law and Commerce 791, 799–800. 
125  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 39. 
126  E W Paxson, ‘Sharing the Benefits of Outer Space Exploration: Space Law and 
Economic Development’ (1993) 14 Michigan Journal of International Law 487, 488–
90. 
127 Gladys E Wiles, 'The Man On The Moon Makes Room For Neighbors: An Analysis 
Of The Existence Of Property Rights On The Moon Under A Condominium-Type 
Ownership Theory' (1998) 12(3) International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology 513, 516; Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 39. 
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customary law, it is likely to evolve with ‘actual practice’.128 With private 
entities such as James Benson sponsoring deep space missions to assert 
‘ownership’ of near earth asteroids, the evolution of ‘customary law’ 
remains inevitable in favour of extraterrestrial property rights.129  
 
D Generally Principles of Law  	  
General principles of law may serve as a good starting point for the 
development of a private property rights regime in Outer Space. According 
to renowned international law scholar, Hersch Lauterpatch, even principles 
of private law may be useful in the initial developments of international 
law.130 However, private law principles should be used sparingly only when 
they are applicable.131 In the context of Outer Space, for example, the use of 
Roman law principles of property, may result in a framework that is not 
only regressive, but chaotic.132 
 
Nevertheless the application of certain fundamental principles such as the 
‘first come first served’ rule remains an issue of common sense.133 
According to Lord Asquith, the progression of the law is often premised 
upon principles of ‘good sense’ and ‘common practice’ of civilized 
nations.134 Hence, it remains highly likely that the ‘first come first serve 
rule’ would prevail in Outer Space.135  In other words, the first private entity 
who manages to assert a legally valid claim to property on the Moon and 
other celestial bodies is likely to be given priority over all others.136  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  Ibid. 
129  J W Benson, ‘Space Resources: First Come First Served’  (Paper presented at the 41st 
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1998) 46. 
130  Hersch Lauterpacht (ed), Oppenheim’s International Law (Longmans, 8th ed, 1955) 
vol 1, 29–30. 
131  Ibid. 
132  R Hara and J Stanczyk, ‘Space Law and The Roman Law Concepts’ (Paper presented 
at the 27th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1984) 51, 54–5; Cf Pop, Who 
Owns the Moon, above n 28. Pop argues that the private Roman Law concepts of 
property offer an important framework for civilised States.  
133  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 39. 
134  Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, above n 130. 
135  Benson, above n 129.  
136  Ibid. 
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E Judicial Decisions 
 
Over the years, private entities have sought to assert private property rights 
on the Moon and other celestial bodies.137 From the creation of James 
Thomas Mangan’s ‘micronation’ Celestia  which claimed Outer Space in its 
entirety as property for mankind138 to A D Lindsay’s registration of the 
Moon and Saturn with the Irwin County Court in Georgia prior to the 
Apollo 11 landing,139 space enthusiasts have never shied away from creative 
ways to assert private property rights on extraterrestrial land.  Despite this, 
the number of judicial decisions considering the issue of property rights in 
Outer Space is extremely scarce.140  
 
1 Yemenis’ Red Planet to Bai’s Tempel 1 
 
While earlier claims of private property rights asserted by individuals have  
often been ridiculed141 and categorized as being frivolous,142 they bear 
testimony to the private entities’ zealous pursuit of property rights in Outer 
Space. Claiming Mars as their inheritance, three Yemen men, Adam Ismail, 
Mustafa Khalil and Abdullah al-Umari, attempted to initiate proceedings 
against NASA for landing its Pathfinder spacecraft and Sojourner rover, 
without seeking prior permission.143 While Brian Welch, NASA’s director 
of media, commented that Mars was collectively owned by mankind, he 
nevertheless acknowledged that ‘when people actually are going to these 
places … more complicated issues will have to be resolved’ as individuals 
commence their journey into Outer Space or discover its valuable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 2–10. 
138  Lambert M Surhone, Mariam T Tennoe and Sussan F Henssonow (eds), Nation of 
Celestial Space (Betascript Publishing, 2011). See also, Benjamin David Landry, ‘A 
Tragedy of the Anticommons’ (2013) 38 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 523, 
574. Landry suggest that it may be possible to create a new state for space colonies to 
gain sovereignty in Outer Space. 
139  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 3. 
140  Ibid 40. 
141  CNN, ‘3 Yemenis Sue NASA for Trespassing on Mars’, CNN (online), 24 July 1997 
<http://edition.cnn.com/TECH/9707/24/yemen.mars/>. 
142  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 40. 
143  CNN, above n 141. 
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resources.144 Nevertheless, the claim never proceeded to trial after the 
Prosecutor General threatened the three Yemenis men with 
imprisonment.145  
 
Similarly in Bai’s case, a Russian astrologer Marina Bai, contended that 
NASA’s collision with Comet Tempel 1, infringed upon her ‘spiritual 
values’, deforming her horoscope.146 Although Bai’s lawyer, Alexander 
Molokhov, contended that her claim of approximately £170 million 
remained well grounded in the law,147 NASA’s engineer, Shadan Ardalan, 
dismissed the proposition by comparing the collision to ‘a mosquito hitting 
the front of an airliner in flight’.148 Establishing the Russian’s court 
jurisdiction to rule on the dispute between NASA and Marina Bai, the 
Moscow City Court passed down the case to the Presnensky District Court 
to be reconsidered.149 However, the Russian District Court subsequently 
dismissed the case.150 Despite this, Bai’s claim remains interesting as it 
attempts to assert ‘control’ over Comet Tempel 1, without formally 
claiming ‘ownership of it’.151 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  Ibid.   
145  Reuters 1997 ‘Get off Mars, it’s Ours, Yemeni Men Tell US’, ThinkQuest (online) 24 
July 1997 <http://library.thinkquest.org/11967/yemeni.html>. 
146  BBC, ‘Astrologer Sues NASA Over Probe’, BBC (online), 4 July 2005 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4649423.stm>. 
147  Ibid.  
148  BBC, ‘Russian Sues NASA for Comet Upset’, BBC (online), 4 July 2005 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4649987.stm>. 
149  Anna Arutunyan, ‘Russian Astrologist Plans to Crash NASA’s Independence Day’, 
MosNews (Moscow), 19 April 2005; Agence France–Presse, ‘Russian Astrologer 
Cleared to Sue NASA Over Plans to Bombard Sentimental Comet’, Spacedaily 
(online), 6 May 2005 <www.spacedaily.com/2005/050506134341.nt1q1zco.html>. 
150  RIA Novosti, ‘Russian Astrologist Loses Damages Claim Against NASA’, Ria 
Novosti (online) 8 November 2005 <http://sptnkne.ws/9dF>. 
151  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 40. Bai’s claim subtly suggests that the ability to 
preclude third parties’ from extraterrestrial land, in itself, is sufficient to establish a 
legally recognisable right in the property. 
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2 Langevin Case  
 
In the recent Langevin case,152 the district court of Québec dismissed Sylvio 
Langevin’s claims of ownership on the Earth, Mercury, Venus, Jupiter, 
Jupiter’s four moons, Saturn and Uranus.153 These claims were subsequently 
amended to include celestial bodies like Neptune and Pluto and the ‘space’ 
between each planet across the galaxy.154 Learning of NASA’s missions to 
planets in the Solar System on 27 December 2011, Langevin155 seized this 
‘unique opportunity’ to ‘mak[e] a collection as others do a hockey card 
collection’.156 In justifying his claims, Langevin contended that there was:  
(a) no owner of the five planets (Mercury, Venus, Jupiter, Saturn and 
Uranus) and the four moons (Jupiter’s four moons);157  
(b) no owner of the planet Earth which undoubtedly remains a 
wandering star amidst the Solar System; and 158 
(c) no viable respondent, except for God, who could not tangibly be 
present to respond to his queries.159 
 
Relying heavily on Judge Etienne Parent’s previous judgement, which 
dismissed Langevin’s claims on Mars and the Moon, the court rejected the 
claim for having no basis in the law.160 Ironically, the court failed to expand 
on the legal validity of private property claims on planets in the Solar 
system. Expounding on Langevin’s extensive litigation record consisting of 
more than 51 complaints,161 judge Alain Michaud suggested that Langevin 
was nothing more than a ‘vexatious litigant’ abusing the system162 and 
should be barred from initiating any further claims in the Court.163 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  Re Langevin [2012] QCCS 613 (Superior Court of Québec).  
153  Ibid [1]. 
154  Ibid [2].  
155  Ibid [4].  
156  Ibid [5].  
157  Ibid.  
158  Ibid [10].  
159  Ibid [6].  
160  Ibid [16].  
161  Ibid [14].  
162  Ibid [23]–[26].  
163  Ibid [40].  
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3 The Curious Case of Nemitz 
 
The Nemitz case,164 comically known as NASA’s twenty dollar parking 
infringement, marked a landmark decision in determining the validity of 
private property rights asserted on Asteroid 433 in Outer Space.165 In this 
case, Gregory William Nemitz, the owner of OrbDev, sent an invoice for 
US$20 to NASA for ‘parking’ or ‘storing’ its spacecraft, NEAR Shoemaker, 
on Eros.166 To justify his ownership of Eros, Nemitz furnished documents 
illustrating his registration of Eros with the Archimedes Institute 167 and a 
California Uniform Commercial Code security interest claim naming 
himself as the creditor.168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004) (‘Order 
Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss’). See also Nemitz v United States (Nev, No 
CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 28 January 2004) (‘Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support’); Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-
RAM, 6 November 2003) (‘Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment’); Nemitz 
v United States (9th Cir, 2004) (No 04-16223) (Appellant’s Brief); Nemitz v United 
States (9th Cir, 2004) (No 04-16223) (‘Appellee’s Brief’); Isabella Henrietta Philepina 
Diederiks-Verschoor and Vladimir Kopal, An Introduction into Space Law (Kluwer 
Law International, 2008) 155–6.  
165  Keay Davidson, ‘Final Frontier for Lawyers: Property Rights in Space’, San 
Francisco Chronicle (online), 16 October 2005, < 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Final-frontier-for-lawyers-property-rights-in-
2564610.php>. 
166  Letter from Gregory Nemitz, CEO of Orbital Development, to NASA, 16 February 
2001 <http://www.orbdev.com/010216.html>. 
167  The Archimedes Institution, Gregory Nemitz, Asteroid 433 Eros, and NASA 
Shoemaker Probe < http://www.permanent.com/archimedes-institute.html>The 
Archimedes Institute maintains a registry of claims in Outer Space. Nemitz registered 
his claim on Eros 433 with the Archimedes Institute prior to NASA’s landing on the 
asteroid. 
168  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004) 2 
(McKibben J). 
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Figure 1: NEAR Shoemaker’s Landing Site on Eros 433169 
 
Edward A Frankel, NASA’s General Counsel, refused to pay the sum 
stipulated on the invoice as Nemitz’s claim failed to establish ‘any legal 
basis … to own Eros or to any legal significance of a filing with the 
Archimedes Institute’.170 Pursuant to the arguments forwarded in Nemitz’s 
earlier correspondence with NASA suggested that:  
(a) An ‘object’ that is not owned is capable of ownership by any 
person who first ‘sights’ the opportunity;171  
(b) Private individuals, unlike States, are not prohibited by the law 
from asserting property rights in Outer Space;172 and   
(c) Physical possession is unnecessary to establish ownership of 
property. Instead, property may be claimed if the claimant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NEAR Shoemaker 
<http://science.nasa.gov/missions/near/>. 
170  Letter from Edward A Frankle, General Counsel NASA, to Gregory Nemitz, 9 March 
2001 < http://www.orbdev.com/010309.html>; cf Letter from Gregory Nemitz, CEO 
of Orbital Development, to Edward E Frankie, General Counsel for NASA, 22 March 
2001 <http://www.orbdev.com/010322.html> (‘Nemitz’s Response Letter’). Nemitz 
responded to the NASA’s letter suggesting that any ‘thing’ that is not owned by 
anyone is capable of being converted into property by the ‘claimant’. 
171  Nemitz’s Response Letter, above n 170.  
172  Ibid. 
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possesses the requisite ‘intention to possess’ the property at a later 
date or add his own efforts to enhance the property. 173 
Fervently contending against his claim being regarded as ‘premature’ or 
‘inappropriate’, Nemitz suggested that he held the ‘highest’ proprietary 
claim on Eros 433.174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Eros Surface175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173  Ibid. 
174  Ibid. 
175 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NEAR Shoemaker 
<http://science.nasa.gov/missions/near/>. Image captured by NASA’s spacecraft 
within 250 meters of Eros’ surface. 
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Although Nemitz’s claim for compensation under ‘breach of contract’ was 
subsequently dismissed by the Federal Court ,176 Nemitz sought a 
declaration from the District Court determining the ability of private entities 
to ‘own’ and ‘acquire’ property rights in Outer Space.177 Asserting a 
violation of Public Law178 and his constitutional rights, Nemitz argued that 
his jus indivium property rights on Eros depended upon ‘the natural inherent 
rights of man, the common law and … the Federal Constitution’.179 Despite 
recognising himself as the ‘free’ and ‘natural’ owner of Eros,180 Nemitz 
implored the court to carefully consider whether ‘actual possession’ was 
necessary to assert property rights in Outer Space.181 Substantiating his 
arguments in favour of private property rights in Outer Space, Nemitz 
contended that: 
(a) NASA’s use of Eros without ‘just’ compensation was 
‘unconstitutional’ (fifth amendment);182  
(b) The right to property in Outer Space cannot be ‘denied’ by NASA 
as it violates the fundamental rights retained by the ‘free and 
natural, living man’ (ninth amendment);183 and  
(d) NASA acted outside its authority, by reaching an adverse 
conclusion on Nemitz’s proprietary claim, as the right to private 
property remains ‘reserved’ by the people and not the government 
(tenth amendment).184 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004) 1–2 
(McKibben J). The Federal Court held that Nemitz failed to adequately establish his 
claim for breach of contract. 
177 Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, above n 164, 3.  
178  National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub L No 85-568, § 102, 72 Stat 426. 
Pursuant to § 102 all activities in Outer Space must be conducted in the interest of 
broadening ‘human knowledge’, enhancing the ‘usefulness, performance, speed, 
safety and efficiency’ of space exploration, ensuring the peaceful use of space 
technology and advancing ‘long-range’ scientific studies in Outer Space.  
179  Plaintiff’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, above n 164, 5, 9. 
180  Ibid 11.  
181  Ibid 6.  
182  Ibid 17. Article V of the United States Constitution prevents private property from 
being taken ‘for public use, without just compensation’.  
183 Ibid 18. Article IX of the United States Constitution states that all rights that are not 
part of the Constitution are ‘retained by the people’. 
184  Ibid. Article X of the United States Constitution states that all residual powers not 
delegated to the state belong to the people.  
	   39	  
Filing a motion to dismiss, the defendant contended that Nemitz had neither 
appealed to the provisions of the OST nor sought a specific declaration on 
the viability of his claim on Eros 433.185 NASA further asserted that in the 
absence of an identifiable property interest, no claim may be asserted 
against NASA for landing on Eros.186 Dismissing Nemitz’s claim as 
‘arbitrary’, the defendants drew parallels with a person ‘pointing to a distant 
star and declaring ownership of it’.187 
 
While McKibben J dismissed Nemitz’s complaint for lacking a clearly 
identifiable ‘legal theory’, 188 his brief four page judgment failed to address 
the fundamental issue of whether private non-governmental entities have the 
‘legal capacity’ to assert private property rights in Outer Space.189 
Favouring NASA’s arguments, McKibben J further contended that Nemitz 
had not only failed to establish a ‘constitutionally protected property 
interest’ in Eros 433, but also, demonstrated that the Moon Agreement or 
OST ‘created … rights in Nemitz to appropriate private property rights on 
asteroids’.190 As a space enthusiast and entrepreneur without any substantial 
legal background,191 Nemitz’s claim neither advanced the general principles 
of property law, including the historical underpinnings of Roman property 
law192 nor substantiated by natural law theorists claiming an immutable 
right to property.193  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support, above n 164. 
186  Ibid 7, 9–10. NASA argued that the fifth amendment was not established as Nemitz 
failed to adequately establish a recognised interest in Eros 433. NASA also argued 
that Nemitz’s claim for compensation under the breach of contract was irrational 
especially when no legally enforceable contract existed between Nemitz and NASA. 
187  Ibid 8. 
188  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004) 2 
(McKibben J). 
189  Robert Kelly, ‘Nemitz v United States, A Case of First Impression: Appropriation, 
Private Property Rights and Space Law Before the Federal Courts of the United 
States’ (2004) 30 Journal of Space Law 297, 305.    
190  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004) 3 
(McKibben J). 
191  Kelly, above n 189.  
192  See discussions under heading general principles of law, above. Nemitz failed to 
provide any advance any argument that his right to property on Eros 433 may exist 
independent of a sovereign and be ‘recognised’ at a later date as seen in the Louisiana 
purchase and Arctic Islands.  
193  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5; Declaration of the Rights of Man art 17. 
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Apart from claiming a broad brushed ‘inherent right’ to property, Nemitz 
also failed to appeal to any space law treaty provisions to ‘perfect’ his claim 
of ownership in Eros 433.194 In the absence of a detailed judgment 
considering the ability of private entities to assert private property rights in 
Outer Space, it is unlikely that Nemitz case may be taken as an authoritative 
determination against private property rights in Outer Space.195 As the 
Nemitz case remains silent on what constitutes a legally valid claim in Outer 
Space, it remains to be seen whether physical possession of Eros 433 may 
have rendered a different outcome.  
 
F An Analysis of the Inadequacies in International Law  
 
In the absence of express limitations, private property rights in Outer 
Space remain plagued by ‘systemic’ non liquet, arising from a void in the 
existing space law.196 As the existence of a non liquet remains a highly 
contentious issue amongst international law scholars,197 the silence of the 
law is unlikely to equate to the absence of any law.198 Rejecting the 
principle of non liquet as a logical fallacy, Kelsen contends that the 
‘residual negative rule’ favours the proposition that in the absence of 
specific prohibitions imposed by the law, all other residual acts remain 
lawful.199 While Lauterpatch favoured a fluid and creative approach to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194  Appellant’s Brief, above n 164, 25. 
195  Diederiks-Verschoor and Kopal, above n 164. 
196  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 44–5.  
197  There is currently no consensus amongst international law scholars on the existence 
of systemic non liquet. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (The Lawbook 
Exchange, 1952) 306. Kelsen argues that non liquet, or gaps in the law, are a logical 
fallacy as acts which are not specifically prohibited remain lawful under the ‘residual 
negative principle’. See also Neha Jain, ‘General Principles of Law as Gap Fillers’ 
(Paper presented at the International Legal Theory Colloquium, New York Law 
School, 27 January 2014) for detailed discussions on systemic non liquet, otherwise 
known as gaps in the law.  
198  Hersch Lauterpatch, The Development of International Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 1982) 165–6; Ian Scobbie, ‘The Theorists as a Judge: Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
Conception of the International Judicial Function’ (1997) 8 European Journal of 
International Law 264, 273–6.  Lauterpatch contends that all international judges 
must appeal to the ‘general principles of law’ to fill in any gaps in the law and add to 
its clarity.  
199  J Stone, ‘Non Liquet and the International Judicial Function’ in C Perelman (ed), Le 
Problem des lacunes en droit (Émile Bruylant, 1968) 305, 308–9. See also J Stone, 
Non Liquet and the Function of Law in the International Community (Oxford 
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bridge the void in the existing international law,200 Kelsen adopted a 
more ‘mechanistic’ approach advancing the ‘residual negative’ principle 
which proposed that all residual acts remain lawful unless specifically 
prohibited by the law.201  
 
Despite its mounting criticism and scarce application, the ‘residual 
negative’ principle remains enshrined in the traditions of international 
law,202 including the groundbreaking SS Lotus case,203 which reaffirmed 
the parties’ ability to act freely in the absence of explicit prohibitions 
being imposed by the law.204 This traditional approach is consistent with 
the views of leading space law scholars who acknowledge the residual 
‘freedom principle’.205 According to Von der Dunk, ‘everything that is 
not, [in] one way or another, prohibited or conditioned is allowed’ under 
the Outer Space legal regime.206  
 
While the ‘residual negative’ principle may provide a determinative 
conclusion on the permissibility of private property rights in Outer 
Space, the disparaging judicial and ambiguity in the existing OST cannot 
be ignored. As the international space law scholar, Virgiliu Pop, aptly 
contends that the extraterrestrial property rights regime has fallen prey to 
its scare legal norms,207 leaving behind a ‘canabalistic task’ for space 
lawyers to:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
University Press, 1960) 127–59. Stone suggests that the ‘residual negative rule’ may 
be problematic especially where the ‘norms say nothing at all’. See also M G 
Markoff, ‘Implementing the Contractual Obligation of Article I of the Outer Space 
Treaty’ (Paper presented at the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1974). 
Markoff opposed the residual negative rule as being regressive. Instead, he proposed 
that all activities should automatically be prohibited unless permitted by the law.   
200  Stephen C Neff, ‘Non Liquet and International Law’ in Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad and 
Michael Bohlander (eds), International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal Order 
and Justice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 71–3.  
201  Kelsen, above n 197, 306. 
202  Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1975) 220. 
203  SS Lotus (France v Turkey) (Judgment) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 10.  
204  Ibid.  
205  Frans G Von der Dunk, ‘Earth Observation and Data Policy in Europe: The Legal 
Issues: The EOPOLE Concerted Action Project’, (Paper presented at the 42nd 
Colloquium on Law of Outer Space, Amsterdam, 5 October 1999) 373.   
206  Ibid.  
207  A L Moore, ‘Space Stations and Habitats’ (Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, Washington, 28 April 1978). 
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[read] between the lines of public international law 
norms, their implications on the private spheres, as well 
as … [analyse] all possible sources of international 
law.208 
 
Describing the extraterrestrial property rights regime as a ‘downright 
hostile’ void comparable to the physical vacuum in Outer Space,209 space 
law enthusiasts such as Roberts argue that the existing space law ‘leave[s] 
gapping holes which must be filled before any serious commercial 
developments can occur’.210 The plethora of ‘imprecise, insufficient and … 
contradictory rules’ give rise to a multitude of diverse legal interpretations 
advanced by renowned space publicists.211  
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 45.  
209  K Silber, ‘A Little Piece of Heaven: Space Based Commercial Development Will 
Happen Sooner than you Think’, Reason (online), 1998 
<http://www.reason.com/news/show/30796.html>; P Magno, ‘Communication’ 
(Paper presented at the 15th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Vienna, 1972). 
Magno suggests that the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty may be considered as 
unambiguous, especially when compared to other areas of international law.  
210  L D Roberts, S Pace and G H Reynolds, ‘Playing the Commercial Space Game: Time 
for a New Rule Book?’, Ad Astra (United States), June 1996.  
211  H Nauges, ‘Legal Aspects’ (Paper presented at the 22th Colloquium on the Law of 
Outer Space, New York, 1979); see also, Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 43. Although 
publicists do not ordinarily have any role in the creation of new law, Virgulu Pop, 
suggests that their ‘interpretations’ and ‘clarifications’ remain instrumental in the 
future developments of the law. Moore, above n 207, 279. Moore cautions academics 
to carefully consider their interpretations of Space Law as it has the unique ability to 
influence the positions adopted by states.   
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III FROM Lunar TO Martian Real Estate: Are Private Entities Capable of 
Asserting Property Rights in Outer Space?  
 
There is no image, no painting, no visible trait,  
which can express the relation that constitutes property …  
It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of the mind. 
      Jeremy Bentham212 
  
Property rights do not form an ‘absolute’ principle, but a variable concept 
that transitions with time as ‘physical, legal and moral conditions’ 
develop.213 Traditional conceptions of property, for example, are illustrated 
by the Roman Law which mandate three modular characteristics of property 
including:  
(a)  the right to use the property (jus utendi); 
(b)  the right to enjoy the fruits of his or her property (jus fruendi); and 
(c)  the right to exploit the property, as his or her own, to the extent 
permitted by the law (abutendi sua quatenus juris ratio patitur).214 
Modern conceptions, on the other hand, broadened the definition of property 
to a metaphorical ‘bundle of rights’ consisting of a wide variety of rights 
such as the right to ‘exclude, transfer, possess and use’ property.215 This 
‘multi-dimensional concept’, when translated to extraterrestrial land 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212  Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation (Richard Hildreth trans, Trübner, 1864) 111–
3 [trans of Traités de législation civile et pénale (first published 1802)]. 
213  John G Sprankling, Understanding Property Law (Lexis Nexis, 1999) 1–2. Property 
rights are often critiqued by leading legal academics as the ‘unanswerable’ paradigm 
which remains extremely difficult to define. Jeremy Bentham, ‘Anarchical Fallacies: 
Being an Examination of the Declaration of Rights Issued During the French 
Revolution’ in J Browring (ed), Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham (William Tait, 
1843) vol II, 501. Critiquing the concept of property, Jeremy Bentham asserted that 
property rights are nothing more than ‘rhetorical nonsense – nonsense upon stilts’. K 
Gray, ‘Property in Thin Air’ (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252, 304. Similarly, 
Gray describes private property as a ‘chaos theory which steadily reveals pictures of 
ever intensifying complexity receding infinitely into the distance’.  
214  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 62.  
215  Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, above n 213, 4–5. 
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ownership, is as impossible as ‘attempting to catch a school of fish with a 
hook’.216 
 
Although Article II of the OST prohibits national appropriation,217 the 
question remains whether the appropriation of extraterrestrial land by 
private entities constitutes an act independent of the State. Scholars such as 
Gray and Crommelin, contend that property ‘is never truly private’, as the 
State adopts an important role in controlling property by giving it a ‘public 
law’ like character.218 By ‘indirectly’ adjudicating on the validity of 
property claims, the State may be seen as asserting ‘delegated 
sovereignty’.219 As Gray fervently contends in his article, Property in Thin 
Air, private property rights are enforced by the government:  
 
‘Behind the “owner” of “private property” stands the 
guardian of “public property” and the “commons”; and 
behind this guardian lie[s] centuries of social thought 
about the ways in which … [property] should be shared 
and distributed’220 
 
This approach is particularly problematic as the role of the sovereign is 
often overlooked.221 Moreover, the role of the State in acknowledging 
private property rights may vary according to the school of thought adopted 
by legal scholars moving forward. For example, if the Hobbes utilitarian 
theory of property is adopted in its raw form, extraterrestrial land may only 
constitute property if it’s surface is ‘fenced’, ‘secured’ and ‘policed’ by the 
government.222 On the other hand, if the Lockean theory of property is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 62. Pop further contends that property rights is a concept 
that varies with the physical limits of time, the development of the law and societal 
changes. See also Gray, above n 213, 295–6.   
217  Outer Space Treaty, Art II.  
218  Gray, above n 213; Michael Crommelin, ‘Economic Analysis of Property’ in D J 
Galligan (ed), Essays in Legal Theory (Melbourne University Press, 1984) 78.  
219  M R Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell Law Review 8; see also 
Gray above n 213. 
220  Gray, above n 213. 
221  Ibid 303–4. 
222  Joseph William Singer, ‘Original Acquisition of Property: From Conquest and 
Possession to Democracy and Equal Opportunity’ (2011) 86 Indiana Law Journal 
763, 778.  
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adopted, property rights may exist on extraterrestrial land, independent of a 
State’s acknowledgement as: 
Everyman has a property in his person. This nobody has a right to but 
himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hand we may say, 
are properly his.223 
 
A Mounting Uncertainty in the Existing Literature 	  	  	   	  
	  	  
Diagram 1: Private Property Rights in Outer Space 
 
While Article 31 of the Law of Treaties promotes the interpretation of 
Article II (‘non appropriation principle’) of the OST in ‘good faith’ giving 
effect to its context, object and purpose,224 three opposing interpretations 
have emerged in the existing scholarly literature (see Diagram 1). The first 
school of thought favours a narrow interpretation of Article II of the OST 
suggesting that private property rights which are not expressly excluded in 
the OST, may be recognised by the State.225 Proponents of the second 
school of thought advocate for the interpretation of the ‘non-appropriation’ 
principle as an all-inclusive provision prohibiting any form of appropriation 
in Outer Space.226 Scholars subscribing to the third school of thought 
suggest that while private appropriation remains plausible under Article II 
of the OST,227 it may never be converted into a legally enforceable right to 
property in Outer Space. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [27]. 
224  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 115 
UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) art 31 (‘Vienna Convention’).  
225  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62. 
226  Thomas Gangale, above n 62. 
227  Outer Space Treaty art II.  
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Yes, Private Property 
Rights are Permitted 
More Restrictive  More Permissive 
 
No, Private Property 
Rights are Prohibited 
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B Yes, Private Property Rights are Permitted 
1 All Forms of Private Appropriation Permissible  	  
Favouring a narrow interpretation of Article II of the OST,228 legal 
academics such as Wayne White, contended that the ‘national non-
appropriation’ principle must not be mistaken for an ‘all-inclusive’ 
provision that prevents private entities from asserting property rights on 
Outer Space.229 To further justify his assertion, White, heavily relied on the 
COPUOS draft resolutions, which called for a broader clause than the 
‘national non-appropriation’ phrase eventually adopted in Article II of the 
OST.230 Although the International Institute of Space Law’s (IISL) proposal 
recognised a key distinction between ‘national appropriation’ and ‘private 
appropriation’ and suggested the use of the phrase, ‘celestial bodies … shall 
not be subject to national or private appropriation’, the drafters’ reluctance 
to insert the word ‘private appropriation’ may be viewed as a deliberate 
attempt to allow private property rights in Outer Space.231  
 
While a majority of legal academics fervently oppose this ‘loophole’ 
theory,232 few space law academics and enthusiasts, such as Wasser and 
Gorove, contend that the OST contains no express provision against 
‘individual appropriation’.233 In his paper presented at the 11th Colloquium 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228  Outer Space Treaty art II.  
229  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10; see also Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 31–
3. 
230  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10; International Institute of Space Law, ‘Draft 
Resolution of the International Institute of Space Law Concerning the Legal Status of 
Celestial Bodies (Paper presented at the 17th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 
1965) 351 (‘Legal Status of Celestial Bodies’); Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Space Law 
(Stevens and Sons, 1965) 416, 419. 
231  International Institute of Space Law, Legal Status of Celestial Bodies, above n 230.   
232  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 63. Pop strongly disapproved the narrow interpretation 
of Article II of the OST which presumably allowed private entities to ‘appropriate’ 
extraterrestrial land. He further claimed that the ‘loophole theory seems to have been 
swallowed by a part of the press, charmed by the impression that Hope has 
outsmarted the UN’.  
233  S Gorove, Interpreting Article II, above n 64, 351–2; Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 
44–5; Joanna Irene Gabrynowicz, ‘The International Space Treaty Regime in the 
Globalisation Era’, National Space Society (online), 2005 <http://www.space-
settlement-institute.org/Articles/IntlSpaceTreatyGabryno.pdf>. Gabrynowicz suggests 
that the silence of the Outer Space Treaty may imply that there is no prohibition 
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on the Law of Outer Space, Gorove further supports his argument by 
proposing that:  
 
[A]n individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of 
another individual or a private association or an 
international organisation could lawfully appropriate 
any part of outer space, including the moon and other 
celestial bodies.234 
 
Equating ‘national appropriation’ with ‘sovereignty’, Gorove further 
advocates that even private property rights asserted by individuals 
establishing a permanent settlement in Outer Space, falls short of ‘national 
appropriation’ unless it constitutes a State activity conducted under the 
pretext of ‘individual appropriation’ or an act of ‘private appropriation’ 
conducted under the ‘supreme authority’ of the State.235  Nevertheless, some 
space law advocates such as Reynolds and Kopel go further by suggesting 
that even the government’s act of recognising and ‘defending’ its settler’s 
future claims on Martian land does not amount to ‘national appropriation’, 
precluded by Article II of the OST.236  	  
Appealing to Locke’s ‘labour theory’ and the civil traditions of property 
law, Wasser and Jobes contend that private property rights need not derive 
from the sovereign, as commonly illustrated in the Common Law traditions 
of property law.237 Unlike the Common Law’s ‘feudal’ origins of property 
which assert that all private property traces back to the Crown, the Civil law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
against private entities asserting property rights in Outer Space. Appealing to the 
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means that the expression of 
one proposition excludes another, Alan Wasser and Douglas Jobes, suggest that the 
insertion of the term ‘national appropriation’ without any reference to ‘private 
appropriation’ proposes a ‘deliberate’ exclusion of the latter. See also Crawford, 
above n 82 for a detailed discussion on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
maxim. 
234  S Gorove, ‘Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty’ (Paper presented at the 
11th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1968) 40, 42.  
235  S Gorove, Interpreting Article II, above n 64, 351. 
236  Glenn Reynolds and Dave Kopel, ‘The New Frontier: Preparing the Law for Settling 
on Mars’, National Review (online), 4 June 2004  <http://www.nationalreview.com 
/kopel/kopel060402.asp>. Reynolds and Kopel suggest that Article II of the Outer 
Space Treaty ‘forbids only national sovereignty’. Hence acts of private individuals 
asserting property rights in Outer Space are not restricted.  
237  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 48–50. 
	   48	  
system stemming from the ‘Roman law’, suggests that property rights may 
exist independent of the sovereign.238 As all forms of ‘sovereignty’ are 
excluded on extraterrestrial bodies, the common law notions of property 
may not apply to Outer Space.239  Pursuant to the ‘natural law’ principle of 
pedis possessio,240 which refers to taking ‘actual’ possession of land by its 
‘use and occupation’, private entities who ‘mix their labour with the soil … 
[may] create property rights independent of the government’.241 As John 
Locke highlighted in his seminal work, The Two Treatises of Government, 
an individual may be entitled to as much property as a ‘man Tills, Plants, 
Improves, Cultivates and .., use[s]’.242 When translated to Outer Space, 
Wasser and Jobes’ interpretations of the OST suggest a limited set of 
property rights requiring private entities or space settlers to only appropriate 
extraterrestrial land which they ‘use’, ‘occupy’ or ‘enhance’ in Outer 
Space.243 	  
It remains difficult to define the ‘use’ and ‘occupation’ of Outer Space as 
space exploration remains in its infancy stages. As space companies such as 
SpaceDev244 and Galactic Mining245 result to robotic probes to ‘remotely’ 
establish property rights on extraterrestrial land, it remains difficult to 
comprehend whether these acts will satisfy the natural law principle of pedis 
possessio. Even if the primary hurdle imposed by the Lockean labour theory 
of property is overcome by appealing to the Czech origins of the term 
robata, implying ‘forced labour’,246 and Roman law conceptions of property 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238  Ibid 48–9; see Gilson, above n 28, 1375–7 for a detailed comparison between the 
Civil law and the Common law traditions of property.  
239  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 49. 
240  Braum Garner, Blacks Law Dictionary (West Publishing, 8th ed, 2004). Pedis 
Possessio is defined as a ‘foothold; an actual possession of real property implying 
either actual occupancy or enclosure or use’.  
241  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 49.  
242  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [32]. 
243  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62, 56–8.  
244  M Dixon, ‘Promise me the Moon: Property Rights in Outer Space’, Accountancy, 
1998, 29. Jim Benson, for example, proposed planting SpaceDev’s flag on Asteroid 
4660, Nerus with a robotic probe to claim property in the asteroid. Unfortunately, his 
proposal never materialised due to a lack of funding. 
245  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 114–5. Using Gemma and Neutron spectroscopy to 
examine Asteroid 2004, GU9, Galactic Mining Industries sought to assert a 
‘telepresence’ on the asteroid claiming its ownership.  
246  Angus Stevenson (ed), Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
1537. 
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which allows slaves, otherwise regarded as ‘chattel’, to appropriate land for 
its master,247 it remains difficult to determine the true scale of property 
rights that may be permissible in Outer Space.248 
 
2 Functional Property Rights  	  
Drawing on the earlier works of Jenks, a prominent international lawyer and 
space law scholar, real property may only be asserted within a facility, such 
as a ‘space station’, attached to the surface of an extraterrestrial body.249 
Any discussion about real property rights beyond a ‘facility’ is not 
determined by the laws governing the use of Outer Space but rather a 
‘question of policy’ which calls for the ‘authorisation’ or ‘recognition’ of 
private property rights.250 Although White fervently opposed Jenk’s 
treatment of real property rights,251 he nevertheless contended that a 
functional property rights regime may be highly desirable for the 
appropriation of Outer Space.252 
 
As Article VIII of the OST, allows ‘ownership’ of objects attached to the 
surface of a celestial body and maintenance of a ‘registry’ of objects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247  H J Roby, Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines 
(Cambridge University Press, 1902) vol 1, 432, 452–3; Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 
112–3. According to the principles of Roman law, property rights need not only be 
asserted a ‘legal person’, but ‘slaves’ acting under the control of its master. Although 
‘slaves’ were incapable of asserting any form of ‘ownership’ in property, it was 
widely recognised that the property they sought to acquire automatically amounted to 
a claim by its master. Using the Roman notions of property law as precedent, it may 
be contended that these robotic probes are able to claim extraterrestrial land for its 
master. By extrapolating it’s master’s ‘intention’ to acquire property (animus) and 
acting upon it (corpus), these robots may gain ‘actual possession’ of the 
extraterrestrial terrain for its ‘owner’, private corporations and humans alike.  
248  Cf Scripps Howard News Service, ‘Own Your Piece of the Rock’, San Francisco 
Examiner (San Francisco) 21 February 1998. Reynolds proposes a ‘reasonability’ test 
which restricts property claims to areas explored by the robotic probe, rather than, the 
entire surface of the celestial body.  
249  Jenks, above n 230, 297.  
250  Ibid. 
251  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
252  Ibid. According to White, private property rights in Outer Space should not be 
conveniently categorised as a matter of political discourse:  
 Why would [the] recognition of property rights outside a facility ‘raise a major question 
of policy’ while property rights within a facility would not? 
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launched into Outer Space,253 title would arise from the ‘control’ of 
facilities or objects attached to the extraterrestrial surface.254 While 
functional property rights do not deal with the traditional notions of 
property which passes through a title which claims ownership of land, it in 
practice is strikingly similar to private property rights asserted on Earth.255 
The right to ‘use’ this extraterrestrial land and its resources would derive on 
a ‘first come, first served basis’ allowing private entities to occupy a 
reasonable area surrounding its ‘facility’ until it is no longer in operation or 
is returned to Earth.256 Simply put, private entities parking a space station on 
an extraterrestrial surface, may be allowed to ‘use’, ‘occupy’ and ‘enjoy’ the 
land and its resources without having the need to establish any form of 
‘ownership’.257  
C No, Private Property Rights are Prohibited  
 
Proponents of the second school of thought rely on a stronger, fortiori 
argument to expressly forbid private property rights in Outer Space.258 
Supported by a multitude of distinct legal reasons, ranging from 
‘teleological’ to ‘systemic’ interpretations of the OST,259 the vast majority 
of space law academics contend that:  
(a)  Article II of the OST should be broadly construed as an ‘all-
inclusive’ provision preventing both private and national claims of 
property in Outer Space;260 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253  Outer Space Treaty art VIII states that any object launched into Outer Space remains 
the property of its owner, even if it is attached to the extraterrestrial surface:  
 A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is 
carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any personnel 
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into 
outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body, and of their 
component parts, is not affected by their presence in outer space or on a celestial body or 
by their return to the Earth.   
254  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
255  Ibid.  
256  Ibid. 
257  Ibid. 
258  Gangale, above n 62; D J O’Donnell and N Goldman, ‘Astro law as lex communis 
spatialis’ (Paper presented at the 40th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Turin, 
Italy, 7 October 1997) 322; Tennen, Emerging Systems, above n 67. 
259  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 64.  
260  Gangale, above n 62; Taylor R Dalton, Developing the Final Frontier (LLM Thesis, 
Cornell University, 2010) 15.  
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(b)  All acts of ‘private appropriation’ in Outer Space automatically 
amount to an act of ‘national appropriation’ as private property 
rights remain intrinsically intertwined with notions of sovereignty 
and cannot come into existence without the State; and261   
(c)  Private property rights, in itself, implies some form of 
‘exclusivity’ which diametrically opposes the ‘objective’ of the 
OST promoting ‘free access to all areas of celestial bodies’.262 
Nevertheless, the prohibition of private property rights in Outer Space may 
appear ‘restrictive’, undermining future commercial exploitation of Outer 
Space.263  
 
1 An All-Inclusive Phrase Prohibiting Private Appropriation  
 
The historical developments of Article II of the OST suggest that the 
‘national non-appropriation’ principle forms an all-inclusive provision 
prohibiting private property rights in Outer Space.264 As noted by the 
Belgium Delegate, the phrase ‘national appropriation’ not only precluded 
the assertion of ‘sovereignty’ in Outer Space but also ‘the creation of titles 
to property in private law’.265 Analysing the practical application of 
property rights under the civil law traditions of property, the Belgian 
delegate further asserted that even private property rights were premised 
upon a ‘public law’ framework which required the State to assert some form 
of sovereignty when ‘administering’ property in Outer Space.266 Similarly, 
the prohibition of private appropriation formed one of three basic principles 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261  Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, above n 130, 555; Gangale, above n 62, 
34–9. 
262  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65; see also Outer Space Treaty art I. 
263  Arjen F van Ballegoyen, ‘Ownership of the Moon and Mars?’, Ad Astra (online), 
2000 <http://www.space-settlement-
institute.org/Articles/archive/BallegoyenOwn.pdf>. Van Ballegoyen, calls for the 
literal interpretation of Article II of Outer Space Treaty to overcome the practical 
‘inconvenience’ caused to private non-governmental entities appropriating 
extraterrestrial land. See also Gangale, above n 62, 38–9. 
264  Gangale, above n 62, 35; Pop, Who Owns the Moon, above n 28, 64. 
265  Marco G Markoff, ‘A Further Answer Regarding the Non-Appropriation Principle’ 
(Paper presented at the 13th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1970) 84–6.   
266  Ibid.  
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of the OST.267 Following this line of argument, the insertion of the phrase 
‘private appropriation’ may appear superfluous, as it already fell under a 
known subset of the ‘national non-appropriation’ principle. 
 
The widespread prohibition of ‘private appropriation’ in Outer Space 
resonates with key documents, which came into effect prior to the 
enactment of the OST. As Article II was seamlessly integrated into the OST 
without significant debate,268 the draft resolutions provide valuable insight 
into the consensus prior to the commencement of negotiations of the OST. 
Although Article II of the OST is not identical to the draft resolutions 
adopted by the New York Bar Association (NYBA)269 and the Institute of 
International Law (IIL),270 it is not substantially different from the broad 
and all-inclusive phrase, that celestial bodies are ‘not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by 
any other means’, inserted at the end of Article II of the OST.271 Prima 
facie, the provision is remarkably similar to an earlier resolution adopted by 
the International Law Association (ILA) which proposed that ‘States would 
not make claims to sovereignty or other exclusive rights over celestial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267  R Oosterlinck, ‘Tangible and Intangible Property in Outer Space’ (Paper presented at 
the 39th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1996) 271, 274. 
268  P Dembling, ‘Negotiating Issues in Forming the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space’ (Paper 
presented at the 40th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1997) 34, 39; E Brooks, 
‘Control and Use of Planetary Resources’ (Paper presented at the 11th Colloquium on 
the Law of Outer Space, 1968) 339, 344. Although space law scholar, Brooks, noted 
that the ‘contracting parties did not wish to foreclose future positions by … precisely 
[defining] the rights … [associated with the use of] celestial bodies’, the scope of 
Article II of the OST may be regarded as ‘settled’ by the contracting parties, 
especially in the absence of any subsequent declarations expounding on its definition.  
269  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 64. In 1960 the New York Bar Association drafted a 
recommendation which opposed the ‘exclusive appropriation [of celestial bodies] by 
any person, organisation … on the Earth’. Similarly, the 1966 draft working paper of 
the IISL proposed that ‘celestial bodies … shall not be subject to national 
appropriation or private appropriation’. 
270  The resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law, in the 1963 Brussels 
Conference, expressly stated that all ‘celestial bodies … [were] not subject to any 
kind of appropriation’. 
271  Gangale, above n 62, 36; cf White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. According to 
White, the absence of the term ‘private appropriation’, in Article II of the Outer Space 
Treaty, resonates with the drafters’ deliberate attempt to only prohibit ‘national 
appropriation’ and not ‘private appropriation in Outer Space. See also Tennen, 
Emerging Systems, above n 67. Tennen explicitly highlights that:  
 The Outer Space Treaty did not create a dichotomy … between governmental and non-
governmental activities in space, but rather established the basic principles upon which 
all space activities, public and private, are to be conducted. 
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bodies’.272 As private property rights on Earth, call for some form of 
‘exclusivity’,273 it may be argued that private appropriation automatically 
amounts to the assertion of ‘exclusive rights’ on extraterrestrial bodies and 
therefore is, prohibited on extraterrestrial bodies.274 Nevertheless, a detailed 
examination of Article II of the OST and the draft resolutions, suggests a 
more restrictive meaning of the phrase, ‘by any other means’ as nothing 
more than the prohibition of ‘national appropriation’275 and the ‘States 
[assertion of] … exclusive rights’,276 respectively. 
 
2 Indistinguishable from Sovereign Appropriation 
 
As the actions of private actors remain regulated by the State, it may be 
argued that private property rights are derived through the State.277 
Entrusted with the power to authorise private activities in Outer Space, the 
State cannot ‘engage in conduct which is prohibited by positive 
international law to the State itself’.278 To recognise private property rights 
on extraterrestrial bodies, would not only be ‘illogical’ but undermine the 
very foundation of international law by offering States the opportunity to 
engage in otherwise restricted activities under the ‘convenient subterfuge of 
… of the private’.279 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272  The International Law Association, in the 1960 Hamburg Conference, adopted a 
resolution prohibited claims of territorial sovereignty in Outer Space.  
273  Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, above n 213, 4–5. 
274  Gangale, above n 62, 36.  
275  Outer Space Treaty art II.   
276  Pursuant to the 1960 Hamburg Conference, states are prohibited from asserting 
‘sovereignty or other exclusive rights over celestial bodies’. See also Gangale, above 
n 62, 36. 
277  Lawrence A Cooper, ‘Encouraging Space Exploration Through a New Application of 
Space Property Rights’ (2003) 19 Space Policy 111.  
278  Tennen, Emerging Systems, above n 67; see also Gangale, above n 62, 36–8; Jenks, 
above n 230, 201. Expounding on the state’s responsibility for national activities, 
Jenks suggests that the Outer Space Treaty does not only prohibit the creation of a 
private corporation by the State, but also, private property rights asserted by ‘its 
nationals acting as a private adventurer’. See also, P M Sterns, G H Stine and L I 
Tennen, ‘Preliminary Jurisprudential Observations Concerning Property Rights on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in the Commercial Space Age’ (Paper presented at 
the 39th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1996) 50, 53. Sterns proclaims that 
property which cannot be ‘publicly’ appropriated, is not capable of any form of 
private appropriation.  
279  Tennen, Emerging Systems, above n 67. 
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From Christopher Colombus’ discovery of America280 to James Cook’s 
quest for the Hawaiian Islands,281 most claims for unoccupied land were 
historically acquired on behalf of or for the sovereign.282 This approach was 
consistent with Lauterpatch’s assertion that  any uninhabited territory can 
only be exclusively occupied ‘by and for a State … it must be performed in 
the service of a State, or … acknowledged by a State after its 
performance’.283 Without being entrusted with a public power to ‘acquire’ 
and ‘administer’ property, private entities seeking to appropriate unoccupied 
masses of land may find themselves acting outside the ‘Law of Nations’.284 
Even if private entities were successful in claiming these unowned 
territories, any ‘recognition’ of private property rights in Outer Space 
mandates either the establishment of a ‘new’ sovereign State, with the 
necessary public powers to acknowledge a claim, or an ‘existing’ sovereign 
State proclaiming that the property had been acquired on behalf of the 
State.285 
 
Assuming momentarily that private property rights are permitted in Outer 
Space, the application of the ‘eminent domain’ principle, renders the rigid 
distinction between a wholly private and public property as absurd. As 
Grotius expounds in his seminal work De Jure Belli et Pacis, the ownership 
of property may transition from a private entity to the State as ‘[t]he 
property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the State … [to] use and 
even alienate and destroy such property’.286 Hypothetically if the principle 
of ‘eminent domain’ is extended to the Lunar Embassy, a successful 
advocate of Lunar land since the 1980s having sold more than 560 million 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280  Christopher Columbus and Bartolomé de Las Casas, The Diario of Christopher 
Columbus's First Voyage to America 1492-1493 (University of Oklahoma Press, 
1991) vol 70, 4; Georg Forster, Nicholas Thomas and Oliver Berghof, A Voyage 
Round the World (University of Hawaii Press, 2000) vol 1, 5. 
281  Georg, above n 281, 7–9. 
282  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65. 
283  Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law, above n 130, 555.  
284  Ibid 554–5.  
285  Ibid.  
286  John E Nowak and Ronald D Rotunda, Constitutional Law (Thompson West, 7th ed, 
2004) 263. 
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acres of the Moon,287 forwards a reductio ad absurdum argument that the 
acres on the Moon claimed by its founder, Denis Hope, are capable of being 
converted into property owned by the USA government.288 This absurd 
transition of private property from a USA national to the USA, in itself, 
represents a logical fallacy.289  
 
While the amalgamation of private property rights with ‘sovereignty’ 
appears promising at first glance, it remains riddled with practical 
complexities. As the OST prohibits States from asserting any form of 
sovereignty in Outer Space,290 it may appear theoretically impossible for the 
State to ‘authorise’ or ‘control’ the actions of ‘their’ nationals,291 especially 
if they were to assume a new identity as ‘Martian’ or ‘Lunar’ inhabitants 
under a newly established extraterrestrial sovereign, which is not a party to 
the OST. Until the ‘national non-appropriation’ principle develops into a 
recognised norm of international law,292 it remains unlikely that these 
extraterrestrial sovereigns, will be subject to these Earthly restrictions.  
Simply put, immigrants assuming a new identity under a novel ‘Martian’ or 
‘Lunar’ sovereign may not be prohibited from asserting private property 
rights on Mars and the Moon, respectively.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287  The Lunar Embassy, ‘The Galactic Government: Solar Land Rush Extended’ (Press 
Release, 1 August 2010) < https://lunarembassy.com/press-releases>.  
288  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65. 
289  Ibid. 
290  Outer Space Treaty art II.  
291  Bogotá Declaration, above n 84; Andrej Gorbiel, ‘The Legal Status of Geostationary 
Orbit: Some Remarks’ (1978) 6 Journal of Space Law 171.The international 
community rejected the claims of a group of equatorial countries seeking to extend 
their claims of sovereignty to the geostationary orbit in Outer Space. 
292  Vladlen S Vereshchetin and Gennady M Danilenko, ‘Custom as a Source of 
International Law of Outer Space’ (1985) Journal of Space Law 22, 22–3. 
Vereshchetin and Danilenko highlight that the ‘norm creating process’ is dependent 
on three factors: 
(a) the participation of states in Outer Space activities;  
(b) its ability to deal with specific activities in Outer Space; and 
(c) its tendency to reflect the ‘actual practice’ of States.   
 Although many states have signed the Outer Space Treaty, its recognition as a norm is 
problematic for three reasons. First, few states have the ‘actual’ ability to engage in 
activities in Outer Space. Second, the Outer Space Treaty imposes ‘general and broad 
legal obligations’ failing to deal with specific activities such as the assertion of 
private property rights in Outer Space. Third, the Outer Space Treaty offers to 
regulate activities in Outer Space even before it is reflected in the ‘actual practice’ of 
the States.  
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Nevertheless, the historical analogies which presuppose that private entities 
can only claim previously unowned territories for the benefit of the State,293 
raises yet another reductio ad absurdum, or absurd, argument. If this 
intrinsic link between property and sovereignty is applied to Outer Space, it 
is likely to draw an important distinction between ‘nationals’, individuals, 
who fall under the control of a particular State,294 and a ‘stateless’ 
individual who is ‘not regarded as a national by any State under the 
operation of its law’.295 While private entities belonging to the former group 
may be prohibited from appropriating extraterrestrial bodies, the acts of 
‘stateless’ individuals is unlikely to amount to an act of the State.296  In 
other words, private property rights asserted by a ‘stateless’ entity is 
unlikely to contradict the national ‘non-appropriation’ principle found in 
Article II of the OST. Although some national laws restricts its nationals’ 
ability to ‘voluntarily’ renounce their citizenship,297 this nevertheless 
remains a viable loophole that future Outer Space explorers and or 
inhabitants may rely on to assert private property rights on extraterrestrial 
bodies.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293  Columbus and de Las Casas, above n 281; Georg, above n 281, 7–9.  
294  Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat (eds) Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants 
and States in the Postcolonial World (Princeton University Press, 2009) 2.   
295  Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, opened for signature 28 
September 1954, 360 UNTS 117 (entered into force 6 June 1960) art 1.  
296  Ibid. 
297  Government of UK, Give Up (Renounce) British Citizenship or Nationality (2015). Cf 
United States Department of State, Renunciation of US National (2015); Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 USC § 349 (1952). The United States of America allows its 
nationals to voluntarily renounce their citizenship without assuming a new 
nationality, even if it renders the individual stateless.  
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3 Contrary to the Free Access Provision in the OST 
 
Adopting a systematic analysis of Article I of the OST, leading space law 
scholars such as Gangale298 and Pop299 suggest that private property rights 
contradict the ‘free access’ provision stipulated in the OST.300 Although 
Article I promotes ‘free access to all areas of celestial bodies’,301 it must not 
be read as a prescriptive provision imposing a positive obligation, but 
rather, a general overarching principle of the OST.302 Nevertheless, these in 
rem rights in extraterrestrial property assumes, not only some form of 
‘exclusivity’, but also, the ability to exclude third parties from ‘accessing’ 
or ‘trespassing’ upon their property.303 Appealing to the principles of 
deductive reasoning, it may be further contended that private property rights 
prevent extraterrestrial property from falling under the control of a single 
individual or a group of private entities.304 Moreover, any property rights 
asserted in Outer Space, may be inconsistent with the primary objectives of 
the OST which implies that the Moon and other extraterrestrial bodies, 
remain ‘at the equal disposal of all men’, as a global common, and ‘non-
appropriable by individual States or private persons’.305   
 
While the ‘free access’ provision may prevent private entities from 
appropriating extraterrestrial land, the ‘free exploration and use’ principle, 
found in the same article, may often be used to justify the deliberate 
appropriation of resources found on the surface and subsurface of 
extraterrestrial bodies. As Gangale contended in his seminal work, The 
Development of Outer Space, the assertion of private property rights 
remains unnecessary in Outer Space as Article I of the OST already allows 
for a limited set of property rights in the natural resources found on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298  Gangale, above n 62, 38.  
299  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65. 
300  Gangale, above n 62, 38; Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65; Dalton, above n 260, 15–6.  
301  Outer Space Treaty art 1.   
302  Gangale, above n 62, 38. 
303  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 65; Jane B Baron, ‘Rescuing the Bundle of Rights 
Metaphor in Property Law’ (2014) 82 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1.  
304  Ibid. 
305  D S Myers, ‘Political Considerations on Some Aspects of the Law of Outer Space’ 
(Paper presented at the 18th Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1975) 66, 68. 
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Moon and other celestial bodies.306 Unlike the free ‘access’ principle, the 
free ‘use’ principle, interpreted in a Lockean manner, permits a limited form 
of ownership in property by infusing labour into the extraction of these 
resources. While far reaching claims for extensive masses of resources and 
land are likely to be prohibited by Article I of the OST, a private entity’s use 
of a limited amount of land and resources is necessary for its continued 
‘operation’ or ‘utilisation’ to be permissible.307  
 
Drawing parallels to the deep seas, Gangale further asserts that the 
extraction of resources from extraterrestrial bodies may be likened to the 
removal of fishes from the deep seas.308 As the deep sea is often categorised 
as res communis or communal property,  the fishes in the deep sea remain 
the common property of all of mankind until it is subsequently removed 
with fishermans’ efforts.309 Impelled by a similar notion, the resources 
extracted from the surface and subsurface of these extraterrestrial bodies 
transition from ‘communal’ property to ‘private’ property belonging to the 
individual.310 Unfortunately, Article I of the OST represents nothing more 
than an idealistic provision promoting the freedom to ‘access’ and ‘explore’ 
all celestial bodies. These broad overarching ‘free access’ provisions, 
asserted in general terms in the OST, should not be mistaken for a restrictive 
provision. By its very notion, the principles of ‘freedom’ and ‘restriction’ 
remain diametrically opposite. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306  Gangale, above n 62, 39–44.  
307  Ibid.  
308  Ibid 42. 
309  Ibid. 
310  Ibid. 
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D Plausible, But May Not be Recognised 	  
Unconcerned with the ability of private entities to appropriate 
extraterrestrial bodies, per se, proponents of the third school of thought 
widely challenge the ‘legal’ validity of private property rights asserted in 
Outer Space in the absence of a recognising sovereign.311 Relying heavily 
on Hobbes theory of property, they fervently advance the argument that 
private property rights cannot exist ‘naturally’ without  being policed by a 
recognized State.312 Unlike the Lockean notion of property, Hobbes’ theory, 
presupposes that private property rights cannot exist in a vacuum, prior to 
the existence of the State.313 Without the requisite societal acceptance or 
acknowledgement by an overarching ‘superior authority’, private claims on 
extraterrestrial land may be reduced from the status of ‘ownership’ to mere 
‘possession’.314  
 
1 Territorial Sovereignty 	  
Although the OST remains silent on the issue of private property rights, it 
expressly ‘undercuts the [State’s] ability … to recognise or enforce a private 
claim’.315 As the national non-appropriation principle prohibits the assertion 
of ‘any form’ of sovereignty on extraterrestrial bodies, any ‘recognition’ of 
private property rights by a State may contravene this provision.316 Hence, 
the acts of  seeking to ‘enforce’, ‘recognise’ or ‘protect’ ‘territorial 
acquisitions’ of its nationals intrinsically amount to an act of ‘national 
appropriation’, prohibited under Article II of the OST.317  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66. 
312  B B Lopata, ‘Property Theory in Hobbes’ (1973) 1(2) Political Theory 203, 204.  
313  Ibid. 
314  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66. Pop contends that it remains impossible for private 
property rights to exist in isolation, ‘outside the sphere of State protection’.  
315  Silber, above n 209; see also, Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66–9.  
316  Silber, above n 209. According to Silber, the prohibition of ‘national sovereignty’ in 
the Outer Space Treaty automatically undermines the State’s ability to ‘recognise’ or 
‘enforce’ private property rights.  
317  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 68. 
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While proponents of this school of thought generally contend that the 
conferral of private property rights by the State in Outer Space is likely to 
contravene the OST, Pop in his seminal work, Who Owns the Moon, 
especially suggests that even a lesser and more subtle act of ‘administering’ 
private property claims in Outer Space may be likened to the materialisation 
of State sovereignty.318 Relying heavily on the Minquiers and Echros 
case,319 which recognised the United Kingdom’s (UK) sovereignty over the 
Minquiers rocks and islets by recognising contracts for the sale of real 
property and maintaining a public registry of privately owned property,320 
he further contended that States, ‘recognising’ private property rights in 
Outer Space, would automatically assume a similar role of ‘sovereign’.321 
Hence all ‘administrative’ acts of the State, such as maintaining a public 
registry of extraterrestrial property claims, is likely to amount to an act of 
sovereignty, expressly prohibited by Article II of the OST.322   	  
Nevertheless, a detailed examination of Pop’s arguments reveals two 
fundamental flaws. First, private property rights recognised by the State do 
not automatically amount to a claim to sovereignty on the extraterrestrial 
body. Secondly, as discussed in the Greenland case,323 territorial 
sovereignty requires two elements: 
(a) an act exercising sovereign control; and  
(b) the requisite ‘intention’ and desire to assert sovereignty.324 
Even if the State satisfies the first element by assuming the role of a ‘public 
administrator’ in Outer Space, it remains highly unlikely to amount to an act 
of sovereignty, especially in the absence of the requisite ‘sovereign’ 
intention. Simply put, the mere recognition of private property rights on an 
extraterrestrial body does not amount to an act of sovereignty, without the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
318  Ibid. See also Island of Palmas (Netherlands v United States) (Decision) (1928) 2 
RIAA 829. As illustrated in the Island of Palmas case, ‘actual sovereignty’ is unlikely 
to be superimposed on a territory in the absence of ‘any acts of public administration’. 
319  Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v United Kingdom) (Judgment) [1953] ICJ Rep 3. 
320  Ibid 65. 
321  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 68. 
322  Ibid. 
323  Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) (Judgment) [1933] (Series 
A/B) No 53.  
324  Ibid 45–6.  
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express ‘intention’ of the State to establish territorial sovereignty in Outer 
Space, through the claims of private entities. As aptly summarised in the 
Greenland case, ‘a claim to sovereignty is not based … upon some 
particular act or title … but the continued display of authority by a single 
State’.325 Extraterrestrial land, unlike the terra nullius examples found on 
Earth, does not sit on the boundary of any State or group of States.326 
Hence, the mere ‘recognition’ of extraterrestrial private property rights, 
especially when carried out by a multitude of States, is unlikely to amount 
to a claim of sovereignty on the extraterrestrial body.327 Even an enabling 
‘act’ or a public registry of extraterrestrial deeds, without more, remains 
consistent with the limited State ‘authorisation’ powers provided in Article 
VI of the OST328 and is unlikely to contradict the ‘national non-
appropriation’ principle.329 
 
The second, albeit stronger reason, for recognising private property rights in 
Outer Space is that the physical ‘possession’ of land ‘hardly extend[s] to 
every portion of territory’.330 Pursuant to the Island of Palmas case,331 
sovereignty mandates a ‘continuous … manifestation which must make 
itself felt through the whole territory’.332 Though manifestly chaotic, it 
remains theoretically possible for States to recognise private property rights 
in Outer Space without any given State or group of States asserting 
territorial sovereignty over the extraterrestrial body. Moreover, as private 
entities only appropriate reasonably sized parcels of extraterrestrial land for 
their ‘use’ and ‘enjoyment’, it is unlikely that the recognition by any State 
or group of States amount to ‘sovereignty’ which is asserted through the 
entire Lunar or Martian territory (see Figure 3). As the property passes from 
the hands of one private entity to another, with the sale of extraterrestrial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
325  Ibid 45. 
326  Bogotá Declaration, above n 84. 
327  See especially Outer Space Treaty art II. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
expressly prohibits States from asserting any claims of sovereignty on the Moon and 
Other Celestial bodies. 
328  Outer Space Treaty art VI.  
329  Ibid art II. 
330  Island of Palmas (1928) 2 RIAA 829, 855. 
331  Ibid 829. 
332  Ibid 855. 
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land, any claims of perpetual sovereignty in the territory may become 
impossible (see Figure 4).333  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Private Appropriation in Outer Space 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333  See, eg, 107 Congressional Record H691 (Chris Hansen) (2002, House of 
Representatives); see also Louisiana Purchase Treaty, United States of America–
French Republic, signed 4 July 1803 (effective 1 October 1804). The Louisiana 
Purchase offers a promising analogy for private property rights in Outer Space. 
Pursuant to the Louisiana Purchase, all private property rights within the Louisiana 
Territory was subsequently ‘recognised’ by the United States of America, which 
purchased the residual territory from the French government. All ‘archives, papers 
and documents were transferred to the possession of the United States of America. 
The seamless ‘recognition’ of private property rights from the ‘vendor’ State to the 
‘purchasing’ State marks a groundbreaking legal precedent that private property rights 
may transition from the ‘recognition’ of one State to another with great ease. When 
translated to Outer Space, the Louisiana Purchase permits private entities to freely sell 
and purchase extraterrestrial land, without any claims of perpetual sovereignty, as the 
extraterrestrial property transfers from the ‘recognition’ of one State to another’. 
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Figure 4: Transitionary Nature of Land Ownership 	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E Evaluating the Competing Positions 
 
Prima facie, as the laws governing private property rights in Outer Space 
remain riddled with ambiguity, proponents of the third school of thought 
advance the most accurate reflection of the existing private property rights 
regime by contending that private property rights, though plausible, may not 
be legally recognised. Although at a cursory glance, the judiciaries’ repeated 
failure to recognise private property claims in the Nemitz334 and Langevin335 
case may lend validity to this position, a detailed examination reveals that 
the court’s failure to ‘recognise’ private property rights in Outer Space must 
not be mistaken for an express refusal to recognise private property claims 
in the future. Moreover, it remains premature to suggest that private 
property rights may not be legally recognisable in the future, given that the 
existing claims of private property rights are based on ‘identifying’ and 
‘claiming’ vast masses of extraterrestrial land in its entirety without first 
taking physical possession of its surface.  
 
Similarly, the outlandish proposals advanced by the majority of Space Law 
scholars, calling for the prohibition of private appropriation in Outer Space, 
remains fundamentally flawed. The ‘national non-appropriation’ principle 
must not be mistakenly construed as a broad all-inclusive phrase prohibiting 
private entities from asserting property rights in Outer Space. Even at its 
most fundamental level, proponents of this school of thought do not only 
fail to balance the interests of private non-governmental entities and 
mankind as a whole, but also, runs contrary to the ‘freedom’ principle which 
promotes the free use and exploration of Outer Space.336 From a pragmatic 
front, the complete prohibition of private property rights leads to absurd 
results as private entities may not be entitled to property which they acquire 
by expending significant resources such as their labour, expertise and 
finances. From a legal perspective, the complete prohibition of private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334  Nemitz v United States (Nev, No CV-N-03-0599-HDM-RAM, 27 April 2004). 
335  Re Langevin [2012] QCCS 613 (Superior Court of Québec). 
336  See Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [37]. Although the earth was given to 
men in common, he can only truly ‘use’ property to his benefit if he is able to claim 
property for himself to the exclusion of others. 
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property rights remains unprecedented even in the existing legal regimes 
governing terrestrial territories on Earth, especially in the deep seas and 
Antarctica, which remain remarkably similar to Outer Space.337  
 
While the permissive approach best illustrates the future use and 
exploitation of extraterrestrial bodies, it may be criticised for its narrow 
interpretation of Article II of the OST and failure to adhere to the ‘common 
heritage of mankind’ principle. A distinction must be drawn between the 
space law scholars, such as Wasser and Jobes, who advocate for all forms of 
private property rights in Outer Space338 and other legal academics, such as 
White, call for a limited ‘functional’ property rights regime in Outer 
Space.339 While the former approach would validate prospective claims of 
entire masses of land or planets in Outer Space,340 the latter would more 
accurately justify private property claims over reasonably sized plots of 
extraterrestrial land based on its ‘actual’ use.341  
 
Nevertheless, the jarring void in the existing laws, or de lege lata, calls for a 
critical re-evaluation of the three positions advanced by space law scholars 
by drawing upon terrestrial examples for clarification. While the 
development of future treaties and laws governing private property rights in 
Outer Space remains a matter of political discourse, legal precedents found 
in the deep seas and Antarctica may provide much needed certainty for 
private entities, especially large corporate conglomerates, who share both 
the means and ability to advance into Outer Space in the near future.342 
Without a viable property rights regime to back their investments in Outer 	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338  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62. 
339  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
340  Wasser and Jobes, above n 62. 
341  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
342  Jonathan Amos, ‘Station Grabs SpaceX Dragon Ship’, BBC (online), 25 May 2012 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-18195772>; Sarah Mitroff, ‘Let’s 
Go to Mars! The Future of Space Travel’, CNET (online), 6 August 2015 
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Resources, Sending a Spacecraft into Deep Space is an Energetically Expensive 
Proposition <http://www.planetaryresources.com/technology/#high-delta-v-small-
propulsion-systems>. SpaceX’s Dragon spacecraft successfully supplied cargo to the 
International Space Station in 2012. Similarly, Planetary Resources has developed a 
smaller and cost effective prospecting spacecraft, Arkyd, to explore asteroids in Outer 
Space.  
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Space, private explorations and operations are likely to come to a revolting 
halt.343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343  Roberts, Pace and Reynolds, above n 210. Roberts, Pace and Reynolds assert that the 
commercialisation of extraterrestrial resources would be unattainable without a 
‘cohesive system of property allocation and rights’. See also Ferrer, above n 41. 
According to Ferrer, the lack of a viable private property rights regime, ‘paralyses’ 
private activities in Outer Space. 
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IV TERRESTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  LESSONS FROM ANTARCTICA, THE DEEP 
SEABED AND THE ARCTIC 
 
[W]hen the slave says:  
the sea is certainly common to all persons – the fisherman agrees –  
then what is found in the common is common property , he rightly objects, 
saying: 
- But what my net and hooks have taken, is absolutely my own 
           Hugo Grotius 1608344 
 
As the extraterrestrial bodies, like the deep sea and Antarctica, are 
commonly regarded as territory that falls outside the sovereignty of any one 
State, it is often relied upon by renowned legal scholars to resolve the 
virtually non-existent private property rights regime in Outer Space.345 In 
addition to their legal similarities in these res communis territories,346 both 
Antarctica and the deep seabed share a remarkable resemblance with Outer 
Space territories which serve as:  
(a)  resource rich bodies which may only be exploited by significant 
technical expertise and funding; and 
(b)  subjected to limited, if not, non-existent claims of sovereignty.347 
Although these terrestrial legal regimes shed some valuable insight on the 
future developments of the property rights in Outer Space, a simple ‘cut’ 
and ‘paste’ interpretation of the lex specialis regime would be unlikely.348 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344  Grotius, above n 21. 
345  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 124–8; Dalton, above n 260,17–22; Lynn M Fountain, 
‘Creating  Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis of the Common Heritage of 
Mankind Doctrine’ (2003) 35 Connecticut Law Review 1753, 1769;  Lee, 
Commercial Mining, above n 47, 204–15, 216–36.  
346  Fountain, above n 346, 1769. 
347  Ibid.  See also Antarctic Treaty art VI. Although States such as Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR, Great 
Britain and USA have attempted to assert sovereignty in Antarctica, their claims 
remains frozen in time.  
348  Dalton, above n 261, 17–22; Lotta Vilkari, From Manganese Nodules to Lunar 
Regolith: A Comparative Legal Study of the Utilisation of Natural Resources in the 
Deep Seabed and Outer Space (University of Lapland, 2002) 143–4.  
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With private non-governmental entities attempting to claim extraterrestrial 
land and resources, in the Space race, these terrestrial examples remain 
imperative to understand whether:  
(a)  a legally valid property rights regime may exist in Outer Space in 
the absence of a sovereign; and  
(b)  private entities may assert full set of private property rights as seen 
in the fee simple examples on Earth, or may only derive a limited 
right to property in the resources extracted through a licensing 
regime, as applied in the deep seas. 
While a majority of legal scholars continue to rely on the terrestrial 
analogies from the deep seas or Antarctica to justify a limited right to 
property in Outer Space,349 few have studied the private property rights 
regime established in the Arctic which was once regarded as a territory 
without any overriding sovereign.350 Unlike the deep seas and Antarctica, 
the Arctic islands of Jan Mayen, Spitzbergen and Sverdrup offer a more 
promising analogy for private property rights to be superimposed onto Outer 
Space. 
A Terrestrial Analogies 
1 The Deep Seas 	  
The first notable attempt to claim ownership in the deep seabed occurred in 
1974, prior to the adoption of the comprehensive United Nations 
Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).351 In this case, an American 
mining conglomerate, Deepsea Venture Inc (Deepsea Venture), filed an 
application with the USA State Secretary and the United Nations (UN) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349  Rossana Settler, ‘Transporting a Legal System for Property Rights: From the Earth to 
the Stars’ (2005) 6 Chicago Journal of International Law 23, 41–4. 
350  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66–8;White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
351  Jack N Barkenbus, Deep Seabed Resources: Politics and Technology (Free Press, 
1979) 37; G Biggs, ‘Deepsea’s Adventures: Grotius Revisited’ (1975) 9 International 
Lawyer 271, 271; Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third 
of a Century’ (1978) 159 Recueil des Cours 228; Markus Schmidt, Common Heritage 
or Common Burden? (Clarendon Press, 1989) 36; Kathryn Surace Smith, ‘United 
States Activity Outside of the Law of the Sea Convention: Deep Seabed Mining and 
Transit Passage’ (1984) 84 Colombia Law Review 1032, 1045; Said Mahmoudi, The 
Law of Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the Progressive Development of 
International Law Concerning the Management of the Polymetallic Nodules of the 
Deep Seabed (Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1987).  
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Secretary General,352 to claim more than 60,000 kilometers in the Pacific 
Ocean’s Clarion Clipperton area exclusively for exploiting the resources 
found for mining purposes.353 As the deep seabed had not been previously 
appropriated by any other entity, the legal brief which accompanied the 
claim documents,354 suggested that it was not only possible for Deepsea 
Venture to occupy the territory, but also, claim ownership of its 
resources.355 Relying on the State’s ability to claim resources, such as pearls 
and oysters, outside its territorial waters,356 the legal brief further contended 
that the deep seabed was capable of being claimed by the private entity.357 
While the company had failed to physically posses the area of its claim, 
creative legal arguments were advanced to suggest that Deepsea Venture 
had effectively ‘occupied’ the deep seabed by exercising ‘reasonable 
diligence’ to exploit the resources in the high seas and investing 
significantly in the project.358  
 
Nevertheless, Deepsea Venture’s claims of the seabed remained largely 
unacknowledged.359 While the USA did not expressly prohibit Deepsea 
Venture from claiming the deep seabed, the USA State Department, in its 
response to Deepsea Venture asserted that it was in no position to ‘grant’ or 
‘recognise’ exclusive mining rights in areas outside its national territory.360 
This refusal to confer private property claims in the deep seabed may be 
attributed to fears that it would open the floodgates for private entities to 
claim extensive masses of the deep seabed, impairing free access to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352  Barkenbus, above n 351, 37; Jiménez de Aréchaga, above n 351, 228; Mahmoudi, 
above n 355, 98; Biggs, above n 351, 271–2. State ambassadors from Australia, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Hungary, Japan, Poland were also notified of the 
claims. 
353 Biggs, above n 351, 272. 
354  Barkenbus, above n 351, 37. 
355  Ibid 37–8; Biggs, above n 351, 273–4; Mahmoudi, above n 351, 99–100.  
356  Barkenbus, above n 351, 37; Biggs, above n 351, 273. Prior to the 1945 Truman 
Declaration, States exclusively claimed the resources found in the deep seabed. This 
included claims on pearls, oysters, corals and sponges found in the deep seas. 
357  Barkenbus, above n 351, 37–8; Biggs, above n 351, 273–4; Mahmoudi, above n 351, 
99–100. 
358  Barkenbus, above n 351, 37–8. 
359  Ibid. 
360  Biggs, above n 355, 273–4; Smith, above n 351, 1045. 
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resources.361 Although other political considerations of States refusing to 
pre-empt the scope of the common heritage of mankind doctrine prior to the 
third conference played a significant role in Deepsea Venture’s ab initio 
failure to claim property in the deep seabed, it reaffirmed the position that 
the deep seabed was not res nullius territory capable of appropriation by 
occupation, but rather, res communis territory which belonged to no single 
State or group of States.362  
 
Following attempts to streamline the laws governing the ‘use’ and 
‘exploitation’ of the deep seas, UNCLOS established a highly successful 
and comprehensive treaty with over 150 signatories.363 Part XI of UNCLOS, 
remains highly relevant to Outer Space as it predominantly deals with the 
exploitation of extraterrestrial resources in the deep seas and its seabed.364 
While many of the provisions found in UNCLOS have been recognised by 
the legal community as customary international norm,365 the common 
heritage of mankind doctrine proposed in Part XI of UNCLOS, remains 
most contentious.366 Article 136 of UNCLOS specifically designates that 
areas which fall outside the States’ 200 nautical miles radius or Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), are regarded as the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’.367 From a legal standpoint, the CHM doctrine called for the 
equitable sharing of all profits derived from the exploitation of the high seas 
and the valuable resources found beneath the seabed.368 In the absence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361  Edward Guntrip, ‘The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Adequate Regime for 
Managing the Deep Seabed’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, 14. 
362  Ibid. 
363  UNCLOS has 157 signatories and 162 parties as of 7 June 2011.  
364  UNCLOS pt XI.  
365  Dalton, above n 260, 7. 
366  Lea Brilmayer and Natalie Klein, ‘Land and Sea: Two Sovereign Regimes in Search 
of a Common Denominator’ (2001) 33 New York University of Law and Politics 703, 
709; Barbara Ellen Heim, ‘Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A 
Comparison of International Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and 
Antarctica’ (1990) 23 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 819, 828. 
367  UNCLOS art 136. 
368  Dalton, above n 260, 18; Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 USC §§ 
1401–73 (2000). Although the USA adopted most of the provisions of UNCLOS as 
customary international law, it remained adamant against ratifying the treaty, 
especially Part XI. To overcome the limitations imposed by the Common Heritage of 
Mankind doctrine in the exploitation of resources in the deep seabed, USA enacted 
the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act (DSHMRA) to protect the interests of 
private entities seeking to exploit the resources found beneath the seabed. This less 
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claims for sovereignty in the deep seas,369 an International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) was created to license and distribute the proceeds arising from the 
exploitation of the high seas.370 Hence, a workable legal regime was formed, 
allowing private non-governmental entities to assert property rights in the 
high seas under the existing res communis regime, adopted earlier.371 
2 Antarctica 
 
While State expeditions to discover Antarctica began as early as the 19th 
century,372 it was not until the 20th century that private entities, involved in 
the whaling boom, began to settle along its coasts.373 Nevertheless, the 
validity of these ‘temporary’ settlements were never legally scrutinised as 
the early settlers continued to operate from their mainland stations and 
never claimed exclusive property rights in the territory.374 To date, the issue 
of private property rights in Antarctica remains largely unaddressed, even 
the seminal 1959 Antarctic Treaty.375  
 
Unlike UNCLOS,376 the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS)377 placed greater 
importance on protecting the Antarctic environment, promoting scientific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
restrictive approach allowing private entities to assert property rights in the deep 
seabed was adopted in the 1982 UNCLOS.  
369  UNCLOS art 137(1). 
370  UNCLOS arts156, 157, 140. 
371  Fountain, above n 346, 1772. 
372 Douglas M Zang, ‘Frozen in Time: The Antarctic Mineral Resource Convention’ 
(1991) 76 Cornell Law Review 722, 724–6; John Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 
1959 (1960) 9 International and Comparative Law Quarter 436.  
373  J Peter A Bernhardt, ‘Sovereignty in Antarctica’ (1974) 5 California Western 
International Law Journal 297; Kurt M Shusterich, ‘The Antarctic Treaty System: 
History, Substance, and Speculation’ (1984) 39 International Journal 800. 
374  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 204; Bernhardt, above n 373; Shusterich, 
above n 373. 
375  John G Sprankling, International Property Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 117. 
376  See especially UNCLOS pt XI. Part IX deals predominantly with the commercial 
exploitation of natural resources found in the deep seas.   
377 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Flora and Fauna, opened for 
signature 13 June 1964, 1998 ATS 6 (entered into force on 1 November 1982) 
(‘Agreed Measures’); Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, opened for 
signature on 1 June 1972, 29 UST 441 (entered into force on 11 March 1978) 
(‘CCAS’); Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
opened for signature on 20 May 1980, 33 UST 3476 (entered into force on 7 April 
1982) ) (‘CCAMLR’); Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources 
Activities, opened for signature on 2 June 1988, 27 ILM 859 (not in force) 
(‘Wellington Convention’); Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty, opened for signature on 4 October 1991, 30 ILM 1461 (entered into force on 
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research and preventing territorial disputes from arising in Antarctica.378 
Although all pre-existing sovereign claims remained frozen in time,379 
Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty expressly stipulated that all activities 
carried out by private entities fell exclusively under the jurisdiction of their 
respective States.380 Nevertheless, the commercial exploitation of Antarctica 
continues to be restricted by ongoing scientific investigations and 
explorative activities.381 
 
In 1991, the Madrid Protocol was signed recognising the need to protect 
Antarctica’s fragile environment.382 All mining activities on Antarctica were 
banned for a period of fifty years or an infinite period thereafter, until the 
ban was lifted with the consent of all the contracting States.383 While the 
ban has not yet been lifted with unanimous consent, the creation of private 
property rights in Antarctic resources remains riddled with controversy.384 
The Antarctic Treaty’s silence on private commercial mining activities,385 
and the States’ failure to ratify the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Activities,386 which would have otherwise offered private 
entities a similar exploitation regime as UNCLOS, makes the future of 
private property rights in the Antarctic Mineral grossly uncertain.387  
 
As the Madrid Protocol prohibits all forms of commercial exploitation, 
except tourism,388 the issue of private property rights in Antarctica 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 January 1998) (‘Madrid Protocol’). See John Vogler, The Global Commons: A 
Regime Analysis (John Wiley, 1995) 79; Heim, above n 366, 839–40; Zang, above 
372, 722–3; Karen Scott, ‘Institutional Developments Within the Antarctic Treaty 
System’ (2003) 52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 473.   
378  Grier C Raclin, ‘From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource 
Exploitation in Outer Space’ (1986) 7 Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business 727, 745–6; see also Antarctic Treaty arts II, IV.   
379  Antarctic Treaty art IV.   
380  Ibid art VIII.   
381  Dalton, above n 260, 22; see also Antarctic Treaty art II.  
382  Madrid Protocol Preamble para 5. 
383  Madrid Protocol arts 7, 25. 
384  Sprankling, International Property Law, 375, 121–2. 
385  Antarctic Treaty arts II, V, VII. The Antarctic Treaty only addresses activities such as 
the freedom of scientific investigation (Article II), the prohibition of nuclear activity 
(Article V) and the freedom to observe and inspect (Article VII). 
386  (1988) 27 ILM 868. 
387  Sprankling, International Property Law, above n 375, 121–2. 
388   Madrid Protocol arts 3(4), 8(2). 
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predominantly revolves around ‘land-based tourism’, especially the 
enactment of permanent structures and buildings to facilitate tourism in 
Antarctica.389 In the speech given by the Norwegian Diplomat, the recent 
developments in the Antarctic tourism industry ‘raise[s] the question of 
private property rights on the continent, for which no agreed framework in 
the Antarctic exists’.390 While there is nothing in the existing ATS 
prohibiting private property rights in Antarctica,391 private entities have not 
yet claimed private property rights in the Antarctic land.392  
 
Any developments of private property rights in the future are likely to be 
derived from the sovereign as private entities build structures and buildings 
within the boundaries of their respective State ‘stations’.393 While States 
may not pursue new territorial claims in Antarctica, the existing ATS 
implicitly recognises de-facto claims of sovereignty in the land under its 
stations.394 Pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty, States do not only have the 
authority to construct stations in Antarctica,395 but also, allow it to be 
‘occupied by its nationals’.396 In the current day, State ‘stations’ have 
emerged in Antarctica with infrastructure and facilities, which may be 
likened to a ‘small town’.397 The McMurdo Station in the Ross Island region 
of Antarctica, for example, has the capacity to house more than 1200 
residents in summer with more than 100 buildings being equipped with 
modern infrastructural facilities to provide water, power and 
telecommunication.398  
 
Nevertheless, property rights asserted under this system may be problematic 
as it does not provide private entities with the ‘exclusive’ right to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389  Sprankling, International Property Law, above n 375, 118. 
390  Kim Traavik, ‘Opening Remarks’ (Speech delivered at the Antarctic Treaty Meeting 
of Experts on Tourism and Non Governmental Activities in Antarctica, 22 March 
2004) <http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATME2004/fr/ATME2004_fr001_e.pdf >.  
391  Ibid. 
392  Sprankling, International Property Law, above n 375, 120. 
393  Ibid 120–1.  
394  Ibid.  
395  Ibid 118. See also Antarctic Treaty art II, III, VII, VIII, IX. 
396  Antarctic Treaty art VII (5)(b), VIII. 
397  Sprankling, International Property Law, above n 375, 121–2. 
398  Ibid. 
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property, which continues to be subject to the ‘free access’ provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty.399 As the Antarctic Treaty allows other States to freely 
‘inspect’ and ‘access’ other States’ Stations, all State controlled stations are 
required to remain open for inspection at all times.400 Without some form of 
exclusivity, even for a limited period of time as seen in leasehold lands or 
licensing regimes, private property rights may not exist in its true form.401 
 
B Analysis of Limitations 
1 The Deep Seas 	  
Replicating UNCLOS in Outer Space remains tricky for three fundamental 
reasons. Unlike the high seas, which consists predominantly of 
uninhabitable masses of land submerged under water and therefore useful 
only for its resources,402 extraterrestrial bodies consist of extensive masses 
of land which may become viable habitats for humans in the future.403 As 
the utility derived from using the Moon and other extraterrestrial bodies 
extends beyond the exploitation of its resources,404 an equitable sharing 
regime may be regressive and detrimentally affect all future developments 
in Outer Space.405 Geographically, many extraterrestrial bodies, such as the 
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402  Richard Young, ‘The Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas’ 
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Moon and Mars, do not fall directly outside the boundaries of any State or 
group of States.406 
 
Pursuant to the lex specialis principle of Space Law,407 the provisions found 
in UNCLOS, may need to be changed extensively to satisfy the unique 
characteristics and context of the existing Space Law regime.408 As asserted 
by Rosanna Sattler, the application of UNCLOS in the Outer Space calls for 
a regime that confers States with ‘exclusive’ rights similar to coastal States, 
allowing them to regulate the mining activities of their nationals within 
these stipulated EEZ.409 By extending the concept of EEZ to Outer Space, 
States may be able to assert limited sovereign rights conferred to them by 
the treaty, without contradicting the ‘national non-appropriation’ principle 
found in Article II of the OST.410 Nevertheless, this approach is particularly 
problematic as it depends upon the allocation of artificial EEZs in Outer 
Space. Unlike the boundaries of the deep seas which constitutes of an 
expressly defined ‘area’,411 extraterrestrial bodies, remain abundant with 
more than 100,000 galaxies identified Laneakia supercluster alone.412 On a 
more myopic scale, without the aid of a ‘pre-existing baseline’, similar to 
the boundaries of the coastal States, it remains practically incomprehensible 
to envision the distribution of EEZs in Outer Space.413  
 
Establishing EEZs within the legal confines of the ‘common heritage of 
mankind’ principle found in UNCLOS remains difficult as the Moon 
Agreement specifies a ‘less detailed’ regime than its predecessor.414 Unlike 
UNCLOS, which details a legal mechanism for the exploitation of resources 
in the deep seas, the Moon Agreement fails to establish a similar Outer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406  Bogotá Declaration, above n 84.  
407  Lee, Commercial Mining, above n 47, 127–8. Pursuant to the lex specialis principle 
of Space Law, general principles of International Law may not apply in Outer Space 
due to its difference in context.  
408  Vilkari, above n 348, 143–4. 
409  Sattler, above n 403, 41–4.  
410  Ibid. 
411  UNCLOS pt V.  
412  Torben Simonsen, ‘Our Place in Space’, Science Illustrated (Australia), 1 July 2015, 
24–5.   
413  Dalton, above n 260, 21–2. 
414  Vilkari, above n 348, 138–140. 
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Space Authority (OSA) to perform the regulatory functions of the ISA.415 
Conceptually, UNCLOS developed in a period where the exploitation of 
natural resources in the deep seas was becoming technologically possible 
and developing nations shared immense power in influencing the 
development of UNCLOS.416While UNCLOS may be valuable in 
interpreting the CHM concept in Outer Space, it remains unlikely that the 
extraterrestrial regime would correspond with the existing regime in the 
high sea as Article 11 of the Moon Agreement introduces an added 
provision conferring an advantage to countries involved in the exploration 
of Outer Space to be granted special consideration.417 As Dalton aptly 
summarises, this subtle distinction in the implementation of the CHM 
provision in Article 11 of the Moon Agreement remains key in 
distinguishing the Outer Space exploitation regime from the laws governing 
the high seas.418  
2 Antarctica  	  
Although the USA President, Eisenhower, lauded the Antarctic Treaty in its 
initial stages of development, as being an ideal model to carve out a novel 
legal regime for Outer Space,419 this position is unlikely to be advanced in 
the current day. Unlike UNCLOS, the ATS is unlikely to add to the 
development of a viable property rights regime in Outer Space. As 
sovereignty is merely frozen in time and not prohibited in Antarctica, it is 
unlikely that any private property rights regime would develop, independent 
of State recognition.420 This approach would be particularly problematic to 
replicate in Outer Space, given the express prohibition of ‘national 
appropriation’ found in Article II of the OST.421 With the Madrid Protocol 
prematurely curbing private interests in Antarctica, in an attempt to resolve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415  Ibid 138. 
416  Ibid 138–9. 
417  Moon Agreement art 11(7).   
418  Dalton, above n 260, 22.  
419  Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, US Congress, Legal 
Problems of Space Exploration, Senate Doc 26, 22 March 1961. 
420  Dalton, above n 260, 22. 
421  Outer Space Treaty art II.   
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the existing ‘tensions between the community and individuals’,422 the 
development of Antarctic’s legal regime in the future remains unknown, at 
best, and obscure at worst. Lastly, albeit most importantly, the ATS serves 
as a poor analogy for the development of the Outer Space legal regime, 
which predominantly deals with the issue of sovereignty and not private 
property rights, per se.423  
 
C Overcoming the Limitations: Re-examining the Arctic Analogies  
 
From a Lockean standpoint, all property on earth is bestowed upon mankind 
in common. Contrary to the Hobbes theory of private property rights, the 
Lockean notion of property implies a ‘natural right’ to private property 
which exists independent of any State.424 Pursuant to Locke’s theory of 
property, private property rights may not only exist well before any State 
comes into existence, but also in land where there is no ‘overarching’ 
sovereign.425 Expounding on the public and private dichotomy, Locke 
further contended that the role of the State remains limited to protecting 
mankind’s innate right to property which he or she derives naturally from 
God, rather than the State.426  
1 Arctic  
 
The Arctic islands of Jan Mayen,427 Spitzbergen428 and Sverdrup429 lend 
validity to the Lockean theory of property. Serving as a legal precedent for 
the fact that private property rights may exist well before sovereignty is 
superimposed over the territory, these Arctic examples provide a useful 
analogy for encouraging further developments of private property rights in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422  Dalton, above n 260, 22. 
423  Sprankling, Understanding Property Law, above n 213, 117–8. 
424  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [25]; Lopata, above n 312.  
425  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5. 
426  Ibid.  
427  The Jan Mayen island is a volcanic island found in the Arctic Ocean. Once regarded 
as ‘no man’s land’, it now falls under the sovereignty of Norway. 
428  With its origins as a whaling base, Spitzbergen remains the largest island in Norway.  
429  Despite being founded by a Norwegian national, the island of Sverdrup was 
recognised as Canadian territory when the Norwegian government failed to stake any 
territorial claims on the island.  
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Outer Space, where sovereign appropriation remains prohibited.430 
International property rights scholar Herschel Grossman contended that 
private property rights may exist in a vacuum without any overriding 
sovereign or legal regime.431 A similar view is advanced by Smith and 
Zaibert, who assert that private property rights remain premised upon ‘a 
function of trust, mutual respect … ontologically dependant on certain 
customs and habits which might have existed even prior to the existence of 
the State’.432  
 
Although State sovereignty was eventually imposed over these terra nullius 
Arctic territories, the existing private property rights were never rejected.433 
The seamless assimilation of private property rights by the newly-appointed 
sovereign, implicitly acknowledged that:  
(a)  private entities had an innate right to assert property rights in the 
Arctic; 
(b)  valid private property rights existed in the Arctic territories prior to 
any claims of territorial sovereignty; and 
(c)  the State’s role was limited to ‘recognising’ these private property 
rights, and not, ‘granting’ them. 
While it remains unlikely that territorial sovereignty would ever be super 
imposed onto Outer Space at a later date, as it contradicts the national non-
appropriation principle,434 this does not serve as a sufficiently valid ground 
to dismiss the invaluable Arctic analogies. This is especially the case, as 
private property rights in Outer Space may be capable of being 
‘acknowledged’ by an international sovereign435 or States who only assert 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430  Outer Space Treaty art II. Pursuant to Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, all acts of 
national appropriation are prohibited in Outer Space.  
431  Herschel Grossman, ‘Property Rights under Anarchy’ (Working Paper, Brown 
University, 2004). 
432  B Smith and L Zaibert, ‘The Metaphysics of Real Estate’ (Working Paper, University 
of Buffalo, Department of Philosophy, 1997) <http://ontology.buffalo. 
edu/smith/articles/lz.html>. 
433  Michael Byers and James Baker, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 24–6; Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66–8.  
434  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 66–8.    
435  Dembling, above n 268, 35. Dembling suggested that an international administrative 
body may be established in the future to deal with the appropriation of Outer Space. 
Jenks, above n 230, 201. Jenks that the right to appropriate extraterrestrial land and its 
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de-facto sovereignty, a limited form of sovereignty.436 As discussed above 
in Chapter III, it remains highly unlikely that States may rise above the 
‘national non-appropriation’ principle found in Article II of the OST by 
asserting a ‘limited’ form of sovereignty. The ‘recognition’ of private 
property rights must not be mistaken with the ‘conferral’ or ‘grant’ of 
private property rights.437 While the former may exist under de-facto 
sovereignty, the latter usually calls for de-jure sovereignty or a legal claim 
to sovereignty in the territory.438 As the Arctic analogies suggest a legal 
regime where pre-existing private property rights were merely ‘recognised’, 
and not ‘conferred’ by a sovereign, it is likely to fall under the former 
category of de-facto sovereignty which remains applicable to Outer 
Space.439  
 
2 Jan Mayen  
 
The Jan Mayen island found in the Arctic Ocean remains an interesting 
legal precedent for private property rights in Outer Space, as it did not only 
highlight that private property rights were capable of existing years before 
State sovereignty, but also, that these pre-existing rights to property 
remained immutable even when sovereignty is later superimposed. In 1927, 
for example, a USA citizen named Hagbard Ekerold began to claim 
property in the Jan Mayen islands under his USA registered Polarfront 
Company.440 Although sovereignty was only imposed on the Jan Mayen 
islands two years later, Ekerold’s pre-existing claims in Jan Mayen were 
‘recognised’ by the Norwegian government.441 As the Norweigian delegate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
resources may become vested in the United Nations, acting in the common interest of 
mankind as a whole.  
436  Sattler, above n 403, 41–4. Sattler contends that a limited form of sovereignty may be 
permissible in Outer Space. According to Sattler, the establishment of artificial 
‘exclusive economic zones’ allowing States to ‘recognise’ the claims of its nationals 
would not contravene the national non-appropriation principle in Article II of the 
Outer Space Treaty. 
437  Ibid. 
438  Ibid.  
439  Cf Pop, Who Owns the Moon, above n 28, 66–8.   
440  G H Hackworth, Digest of International Law (United States Government Printing 
Office, 1940) vol 1, 475–6.  
441  Ibid 475. 
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contended, ‘the occupation of Jan Mayen by Norway … in no way … 
cause[d] changes in the rights which, according to civil law, exist[ed] on the 
island’.442 Similarly in case of Jacobsen v Norwegian Government,443 the 
Norwegian Supreme Court held in favour of the plaintiff, that the 
Norwegian government could not claim land that had already been 
appropriated by a private entity, a long staying resident on the Jan Mayen 
island. In deciding the matter, careful consideration was given to determine 
whether valid private property rights had existed prior to the introduction of 
sovereignty.444 As the plaintiff, Jacobsen, had effectively occupied the 
property before Norwegian sovereignty was imposed, his claims were 
recognised.445 The court nevertheless made a key observation that private 
entities may assert valid private property rights in the absence of any 
sovereign ‘recognition’ or overriding sovereign ‘authority’:446   
 
‘Individuals … establish[ed] property rights … in [the] 
Jan Mayen Island in 1921, some eight years before 
formal annexation by Norway as terra nullius’ 447 
3 Sverdrup  
 
Similarly, in the remotely located Sverdrup Islands, discovered and named 
after renowned Norwegian explorer Otto Sverdrup, Norwegian sovereignty 
was never imposed over the island.448 Recognising Otto Sverdrup’s possible 
right to property on the island, the Canadian government offered to pay him 
$67,000 for the maps of the island and any other documents evidencing his 
voyage.449 Had the Canadian government regarded the Sverdrup Island as 
being claimed by Otto Sverdrup for Norway, any compensation offered to 
him would have been unnecessary. In other words, if no valid ‘private 
claims’ or ‘sovereignty’ had been asserted on the Sverdrup island since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Ibid 475–6. 
443  [1993] Norske Retsidende 511, 7 Ann Dig 109 (Norway SC) 59. 
444  Ibid.  
445  Ibid. 
446  Ibid.  
447  Derek W Bowett, The Legal Regime of Islands in International Law (Oceana, 1979) 
59. 
448  Byers and Baker, above n 433, 24–5. 
449  Ibid. 
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discovery, the Canadian government would not have required permission to 
impose Canadian sovereignty over the supposedly terra nullius territory. 
Without any prior claims of sovereignty on the island,450 the Canadian 
government’s ‘act’of offering valuable compensation to private explorer, 
Otto Sverdrup, is likely to implicitly reaffirm his innate right to property in 
the Island and the validity of his private property rights claim.  
4 Spitzbergen  	  
Out of all the Arctic examples, the Spitzbergen Islands serves as the best 
analogy in favour of private property claims asserted in ‘no man’s land’, the 
terra nullius land. It not only re-affirmed that private property rights were 
capable of existing in land without any overriding sovereign, but also, that it 
was likely to be recognised at a later date if sovereignty is eventually 
imposed. The organic development of property rights on the island, remains 
commendable. 
 
Developments in the private property rights regime on the Spitzbergen 
Islands began as early as the 20th century when it became an area frequented 
by ‘whalers’ and ‘hunters’ belonging to a wide variety of different 
nationalities.451 Permanent occupation of the island remained impossible 
due to the harsh weather conditions leaving the islands inhabitable for up to 
nine months each year.452 Nevertheless, no sovereignty was asserted in the 
territory.453    
 
This position quickly changed with the discovery of rich sources of coal.454    
States which were initially disinterested in asserting sovereignty in the 
Island, became adamant about protecting the interests of their nationals, 
especially the private property rights which had been asserted in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450  Ibid 25. 
451  R Lansing, ‘A Unique International Problem’ (1917) 11(4) The American Journal of 
International Law 763, 763.  
452  Ibid. 
453  Ibid 764.  
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Spitzbergen Island previously.455 In a frantic attempt to notify the world, 
many private non-governmental entities began turning to their respective 
sovereigns to inform them of their claims on the Spitzbergen Island.456  
 
Although sovereignty was eventually vested in the Norwegian government, 
the 1920 Spitzbergen Treaty457 carved out a unique, unprecedented solution 
‘recognising’ these pre-existing private property rights in the Spitzbergen 
Island.458 Pursuant to Article 6 of the Treaty, all claims asserted by private 
entities taking ‘possession’ or ‘occupation’ of the Island, were 
recognised.459 The administration of these private property rights was dealt 
with in further detail in Annex 1 of the Treaty which called for the private 
entities to ‘notify’ the Norwegian government of all claims which had been 
asserted prior to signing the Spitzbergen Treaty.460 Upon satisfying the 
Commissioner that a valid claim existed,461 the private entity was conferred 
with a title ‘recognising’ his or her exclusive use of the land.462 Any claims 
which remained ‘unrecognised’ by the Commissioner463 or unresolved even 
after arbitration464 were extinguished.465 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455  Ibid 763–4. In rhetoric, Lansing aptly summarises the problems private entities may 
face in protecting their private property rights in ‘no man’s land’:   
 If this population increased and persons of different nationalities settled in the islands 
laying claim to lands already claimed by others, how would these people be governed 
and to what authority could they appeal to settle their conflicting claims and to protect 
them in the enjoyment of their rights? 
456  Pop, Who Owns the Moon, above n 28, 67. 
457  Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, signed 9 February 1920, [1925] 
ATS 10 (entered into force 14 August 1925) (‘Spitzbergen Treaty’). 
458  Lansing, above n 451, 475. According to Lansing the circumstances in the 
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459  Spitzbergen Treaty art 6. 
460  Ibid annex 1(1).  
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D Outer Space: The New Arctic? 	  
While the Arctic analogies offer a promising start in determining whether 
private property rights may exist in Outer Space under the existing legal 
regime, it does not resolve the current ambiguities which plague this regime. 
As private entities from a plethora of different nations advance towards 
Outer Space, 466 in an attempt to claim exclusive ownership over its land and 
resources, it is likely to result in various competing claims being asserted on 
land where there is no overriding sovereign authority. Like the Arctic, as 
these Outer Space land and resource claims become more commercially 
viable, States are likely to become interested in protecting the pre-existing 
claims of their nationals.467  
 
Although the Arctic analogies are likely to serve as valuable legal precedent 
re-affirming private entities’ ability to appropriate extraterrestrial land and 
resources on a first come first serve basis, any subsequent ‘recognition’ or 
‘endorsement’ by the State remains impossible in Outer Space as it prohibits 
all forms of sovereignty. Simply put, while the Arctic territories answer in 
the affirmative that valid private property rights asserted may exist in Outer 
Space as private non-governmental entities occupy its land, it continues to 
leave a jarring gap on how these property rights may be subsequently 
‘recognised’ or ‘administered’. Nevertheless, a workable property rights 
regime, which introduces greater certainty in Outer Space remains critical to 
avoid the chaos, which existed in the Spitzbergen Islands, prior to the 
enactment of the Spitzbergen Treaty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
466  As individuals venture towards Planets such as Mars it is likely that any private 
property claims in Outer Space, similar to those asserted on the Spitzbergen Islands, 
would arise from settlers of different nationalities. See, eg, Jennifer Jaurez and 
Elizabeth Landau, ‘More than 100,000 want to Go to Mars and Not Return’, CNN 
(online) 15 August 2013 < http://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/09/tech/innovation/mars-
one-applications/>. Mars One, Meet The Mars 100 <https://community.mars-
one.com/last_activity/ALL/18/82/ALL/ALL/5/3>. The hundred individuals selected 
for this journey to colonise Mars come from a multitude of different countries ranging 
from Japan to Denmark.  
467  See, eg, American Space Technology for Exploring Resource Opportunities in Deep 
Space (ASTEROIDS) Act, HR 5063, 113th Congress (2014) §§ 51301, 51302. The 
United States of America has already begun looking towards protecting the claims of 
private entities in Outer Space.  
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Despite its remarkable resemblance with Outer Space, the mounting 
uncertainty in the property rights regime in Outer Space, cannot simply be 
resolved by ‘superimposing’ an Arctic legal regime. Firstly, it remains 
uncertain which governmental or regulatory bodies, if any, would play the 
Norwegian governments equivalent in recognising private property rights in 
Outer Space. Secondly, unlike the Arctic islands of Spitzbergen, Outer 
Space is already pre-disposed to an existing legal regime and doctrines such 
as the CHM are likely to cause a significant deviation in any property rights 
regime which may be proposed in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   85	  
V THE SOLUTION: OVERCOMING THE UNWORKABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
REGIME 
 
Earth is the cradle of mankind:  
but one cannot stay in the cradle forever 
Konstantin Tsiolkovsky 
A Land beyond the Sovereign: Terra Nullius or Terra Communis 
 
Although a minority of legal scholars including Verplaetse468 and Bin 
Cheng469 suggested that Outer Space should be governed by the principles 
of res nullius, which refers to property without an owner, but capable of 
ownership by anyone including a sovereign, this proposition was rejected by 
subsequent legal literature.470 It is now commonly accepted that Outer 
Space Property is regarded as res communis but the distinction between res 
communis omnium and res extra commercium remains a little more obscure.  
 
Despite Goedhuis471 and Mayer472 contending in favour of the Roman 
private law concept of res communis omnium,473 this ‘traditional’ res 
communis approach is problematic.  As the ‘traditional’ res communis 
concept remains entrenched in the principles of ‘individualism’, this 
inherently contradicts its ‘community oriented’ underpinnings.474 Despite 
the subtle distinction, the concept of res extra commercium is 
interchangeably used with the concept of res communis omnium, to refer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468   J Verplaetse, ‘Can Individual Nations Obtain Sovereignty over Celestial Bodies?’ 
(Speech delivered at the 3rd Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, 1961) 311. 
469  Bin Cheng, ‘From Air Law to Space Law’ (1960) 13 Current Legal Problems 229, 
234. Note this was one of the earlier works by Bin Cheng. His later works deviated 
away from the concept of res nullius in Outer Space.  
470  Gillian Triggs, International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices, 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2011).  
471  D Goedhuis, ‘Air Sovereignty and the Legal Status of Outer Space’ (Paper presented 
at the 49th Conference of the International Law Association, Hamburg, 1960). 
472  A Meyer (Paper presented at the 49th Conference of the International Law 
Association, Hamburg, 1960) 7. 
473  The principle of Res Communis Omnium refers to territory capable of free use by any 
state or private entity but precluded from private ownership. 
474  Kamal Baslar, The Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1998) 41. 
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the Outer Space regime. While the res extra commercium principle finds 
striking parallels in both the deep sea and outer space regime, it specifically 
deals with ‘things outside commerce … [that are] not subject to national 
appropriation, but open to all.’475 
  
Commenting on the res communis theory in the context of the high seas, 
Van Hoof, brought forth an interesting distinction between the res 
communis theory and the res communis humanitatis.476 While the former 
theory imposes a formidable ‘formal equality’ the latter seeks ‘substantive 
equality … ensur[ing] that the benefits flowing from the use of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction … are equitably shared’.477 Leading space 
scholars, including Christol478 and Bin Cheng479 have adopted this concept 
of res communis humanitatis to fill in the gaps arising immediately after the 
introduction of the ‘common heritage of mankind doctrine’ in Outer Space. 
Although Bin Cheng acknowledges that the res communis humanitatis is not 
precisely defined, he contends that it: 
 
‘convey[s] the idea that the management, exploitation 
and distribution of natural resources … are matters to be 
decided by the international community … and are not 
to be left to the initiative and discretion of individual 
States or their nationals’.480 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475  Tronchetti, above n 36, 13.  
476  Bin Cheng, ‘The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary 
Problem’ (1980) 5 Annals of Air and Space Law 323, 337 (‘The Legal Regime of 
Airspace and Outer Space’).  
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480  Ibid.  
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B Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) Doctrine  	  	  
The Commons regime is not new to mankind.481 Having existed as early as 
the sixth century when areas such as the sea, its shores and air were 
considered communal property, the res communis principle applied to 
public goods which were not capable of ownership or possession by any 
private or public entity.482 It allowed private entities to ‘use’ the communal 
property without obstruction, while affording other private entities the same 
privilege to ‘use’ the property when it was no longer utilised by the first 
entity.483 According to the French jurist Pothier: 
 
things which were common to all belonged no more to 
one than to the others … no one could prevent another 
from taking these common things … [w]hilst he was 
using them, others could not disturb him; but when he 
ceased to use them … another could use them.484  
 
While the legal interpretation of the CHM has evolved over the years,485 
territories governed by the doctrine remain subject to profit sharing 
provisions mandating the equitable sharing of all benefits derived from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481  Baslar, above n 474, 80; Kevin V Cook, ‘The Discovery of Lunar Water: An 
Opportunity to Develop a Workable Moon Treaty’ (1999) 11 Georgetown 
International Environmental Law Review 647, 656–9; Guntrip, above n 361, 387.  
See also Moon Agreement art 11; UNCLOS arts 136, 140. The common heritage of 
mankind principle: 
(a) prohibits private appropriation;  
(b) allows the peaceful use of the land; 
(c) mandates parties to share the benefits derived from its exploitation; and 
(d) establishes an international management regime.  
482  Ceasar Flavius Justinian, The Institutes of Justinian (J B Moyle trans, Oxford, 1913) 
vol 2, ch 1 [trans of: Institutiones Justiniani (first published 533)]. The Roman law 
private property rights regime states that the running water, seas and seashore:  
 are by natural law common to all … no one is therefore forbidden access to the seashore 
…the public use of the seashore, as of the sea itself, is part of the law of nations; 
consequently every one is free to build a cottage upon it for purposes of retreat, as well 
as to dry his nets and haul them up from the sea. But they cannot be said to belong to any 
one as private property, but rather are subject to the same law as the sea itself, with the 
soil or sand which lies beneath it.  
483  Geer v Connecticut, 161 US 519 (Sup Ct, 1896).  
484  Ibid.  
485  See Tronchetti, above n 36, 91–125 for a detailed discussion on the origins and 
evolution of the common heritage of mankind principle.  
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exploitation of the land and its resources.486 Ironically, the doctrine which 
promotes the ‘preservation’ and ‘collective management’ of the global 
commons, results in the over exploitation of natural resources.487 As 
individuals pursue their own interests over the interests of the community, 
the benefits gained from the maximum exploitation of natural resources by 
the individual far outweigh the costs incurred by the community at large.488  
Often categorised as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, the CHM leads to a 
disproportional enjoyment of the benefits by one individual at the expense 
of all others.489 As Hardin aptly summarised in his seminal work, The 
Tragedy of the Global Commons, the problematic nature of the CHM 
principle is best evidenced when:   
 
[e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his heard without limiting a world that is 
limited. Ruin is the destination towards which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society 
that believes in the freedom of the commons.490 
 
In the context of Outer Space, the CHM doctrine renders the Moon and all 
other celestial bodies as the property of everybody’s, yet nobody’s.491 
Pursuant to the ‘province of mankind’ doctrine found in Article I of the 
OST, the Moon and all other celestial bodies remain the common property 
of all people and states and therefore, open to all to freely ‘explore’ and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486  Baslar, above n 474; Guntrip, above n 361, 387. 
487  Garrett Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243, 1244–5; 
see also Fred P Bosselman, ‘Replaying the Tragedy of Commons’ (1996) 13 Yale 
Journal of Regulations 391, 391–2.   
488  Hardin, above n 487, 1244. Hardin contends that the commons regime fosters the over 
exploitation of resources as each private entity, in the herd, asks themselves:  
 What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my heard? … [T]he rational 
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another 
animal to his herd. And another; and another …  
489  Ibid. According to Hardin, the detriment suffered by the community far outweighs the 
utility gained by the individual:  
 Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the 
positive utility is nearly +1 … however, the effects of overgrazing [created by one more 
animal] are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision 
making herdsman is only a fraction of –1.  
490  Ibid.   
491  Pop, above n 28, 73–4. 
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‘use’.492 While the over-exploitation of Outer Space remains a non-issue as 
private entities have not yet begun exploiting these extraterrestrial land and 
resources, advancing the CHM doctrine may lead to dire consequences 
synonymous with the over-exploitation of resources on Earth.493 From an 
economic standpoint, the CHM doctrine imposes an unnecessary financial 
burden on private entities to share their benefits, undermining their ability to 
recoup their investments.494 The application of the CHM doctrine in Outer 
Space, coupled with the surrounding ambiguity in the private property rights 
regime, has grossly impeded future developments in Outer Space.495    
 
Under the CHM doctrine, private property rights in Outer Space may never 
exist in its full form. As private property rights are premised upon three key 
criteria, namely the right to ‘use’, ‘benefit’ from and ‘abuse’ property, all 
three must be present before private property rights may be asserted in the 
extraterrestrial land and resources.496 While the right to ‘use’ and ‘benefit’ 
from the property is inherently implied in the application of the CHM 
doctrine, the right to ‘abuse’ property appears more obscure.497 Arising from 
the need to assert full control over the property, the right to ‘abuse’ property 
under the civil law traditions involves ‘the right to dispose of one’s property 
– to transform, destroy and alienate it’.498 As the res communis principle 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492  Outer Space Treaty art I. The phrase ‘province of mankind’ is often used 
interchangeably with the ‘common heritage of mankind’ by leading space law 
academics.  
493  Fountain, above n 345, 1760. 
494 Ibid. 
495  Ezra J Reinstein, ‘Owning Outer Space’ (1999) 20 Northwestern Journal of 
International Law and Business 59, 61–2; Heim, above n 366, 827–8; Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, ‘International Space Law: Into the Twenty First Century’ (1992) 25 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 225. According to Reynolds, a well-
established property rights regime remains imperative for the private sector to invest 
in Outer Space.  Lawrence L Risley, ‘An Examination of the Need to Amend Space 
Law to Protect the Private Explorer in Outer Space’ (1998) 26 Western State 
University Law 47. Laurence calls for a change of the existing space law to 
incentivise private entities to pursue ventures into Outer Space. Julie A Jiru, ‘Star 
Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint Chips off a Treaty’s Golden Handcuffs’ 
(2000) 42 South Texas Law Review 155. Julie asserts that the ambiguities in the 
existing Outer Space Treaty, especially in the area of property rights, impede the 
commercialization of Outer Space. 
496  Pop, The Moon, above n 28, 62. 
497  Ibid 76–7.  
498  Ibid. See also Rose Susan Ackerman, ‘Inalienability and the Theory of Property 
Rights’ (1985) 85(5) Columbia Law Review 931, 935. Ackerman highlights that 
property in its purest form permits both gifts and sales.  
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prohibits private entities from asserting full control over the property in 
perpetuity even when it is no longer being used, the right to ‘abuse’ property 
in Outer Space may be limited. Similarly any transfer of pre-existing 
interests in the extraterrestrial land remains impossible under the CHM 
doctrine.  
 
C Re-evaluating Hugo Grotius’ Mere Liberum 
 
Although the development of the existing Outer Space legal regime is 
largely derived from UNCLOS, which in turn draws from the works of 
Dutch scholar, Hugo Grotius’ mare liberum,499 its archaic principles must 
be urgently re-interpreted. According to Listner, the commons paradigm 
does not only stifle the commercial development of Outer Space, but also, 
mankind’s expansion towards the final frontier.500 While Hugo Grotius’ 
categorisation of the res communis property as belonging to all mankind is 
not problematic, his interpretation that communal property is not capable of 
‘exclusive ownership’ is unnecessarily restrictive.501  
 
A better interpretation of communal property is entrenched in the Lockean 
‘labour theory’ of property. The Lockean epistemology, provides a 
noteworthy theory to reform the existing Outer Space Treaties, while 
recognising the notion of common property. This theory is highly beneficial, 
as it does not prohibit the extraction of resources found on the moon and 
other celestial bodies while contributing to the benefit of mankind. 
According to Locke, property bestowed upon man in common need not 
remain communal property and is capable of private appropriation.502 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499   Lea Brilmayer and Natalie Klein, ‘Land and Sea: Two Sovereignty Regimes in 
Search of a Common Denominator’ (2001) 33 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 703, 706–9; Fountain, above n 345,1759.  
500  M J Listner, ‘It’s Time to Rethink International Space Law’, The Space Review 
(online), 31 May 2005 <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/381/1>. 
501  Brilmayer and Klein, above n 499, 707; Fountain, above n 345,1759. Pursuant to 
Hugo Grotius’ theory on the freedom of the seas, things which could not be 
‘enclosed’ or ‘contained’ are not regarded as property. Grotius further claimed that 
the seas were the common property of mankind and therefore not capable of exclusive 
ownership by any entity.  
502  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [26]. 
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is best exemplified in the Locke’s seminal work in the Second	  Treatise	  of	  Civil	  Government which states that: 
 
God gave the world to men in common, but since He 
gave it to them for their benefit and the greatest 
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, 
it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain 
common.503 
 
A similar position was advanced by Pothier who suggested that while the 
‘first of mankind’ shared property on Earth in common, it was subsequently 
partitioned by men as ‘the human race multiplied’.504 
 
As the world was bequeathed to ‘men in common … by the spontaneous 
hand of nature’, it is incapable of becoming the property of any private 
entity in its ‘natural state’.505 Nevertheless, men’s relentless quest for 
resources to sustain himself reaffirms  his need to privately appropriate 
property beneficially for his use.506 Quoting the archaic example of native 
Indian hunters, Locke reaffirmed the need for the native Indians to be able 
to exclusively claim the ‘fruits’ and ‘venison’ which they heavily rely on for 
their nourishment.507 Without the ability to assert exclusive private property 
rights, to the exclusion of all others, the native Indian remained incapable of 
deriving any benefit from the land.508  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503  Ibid [34]. 
504  Geer v Connecticut, 161 US 519 (Sup Ct, 1896). 
505  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [26]. 
506  Ibid.  
507  Ibid.  
508  Ibid. 
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D Homesteading the CHM Doctrine 
 
Private property rights asserted in land adds to the CHM doctrine especially 
when it leaves behind property in a similar abundance for others to 
appropriate:  
[M]en had a right to appropriate, by their labour … as 
much of the things of nature, as he could use … 
[without] prejudic[ing] others, where the same plenty 
was still left to those who would use the same 
industry.509 
When applied to the context of Outer Space, the Lockean theory of property 
is likely to favour the appropriation of private property rights in Outer 
Space. With more than 100,000 known galaxies in Outer Space and trillions 
of comets in the Oort cloud alone, the resources and land in Outer Space 
remains virtually infinite.510 As Outer Space promises enough land for 
humans to ‘privately’ appropriate ‘world-sized heavens’ for ‘every member 
of the human species, back to the first ape-man’,511 it remains unlikely that 
private property rights asserted by one or more individuals, would 
significantly undermine others from asserting a similar set of property 
rights.   
 
The appropriation of CHM territory is not without legal precedent. In the 
19th century homesteading movement, the USA government took on a 
mammoth task of establishing a private property rights regime in the 
communal property, which the USA had recently acquired.512 Recognising 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509  Ibid [37]. 
510  Horst Uwe Keller et al, ‘Deep Impact Observations by OSIRIS Onboard the Rosetta 
Spacecraft’, Science (online), 14 October 2005 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/310/5746/270.short>; Editorial, ‘Fly through 
All Known Galaxies in the Universe’, The Telegraph (London) 13 March 2014; see 
also T S Twibell, ‘Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialisation and 
Development of Outer Space’ (1997) 65 University of Missouri Kansas City Law 
Review 589, 637. Twibell contends that without a strong legal infrastructure, Outer 
Space’s infinite resources and rewards remain beyond the reach of humans.  
511  A C Clarke and S Kubrick, Foreword to 2001: A Space Odyssey (Orbit, 1999) 7.  
512  Ackerman, above n 498, 958; Dean Lueck, ‘The Rule of First Possession and the 
Design of the Law’ (1995) 38(2) Journal of Law and Economics 393, 414–5. Terry L 
Anderson and Peter J Hill, ‘The race for property rights’ (1990) 33(1) Journal of Law 
and Economics 177, 196–7. 
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the need to expand human settlements into the ‘Great American Desert’, the 
USA Senetor Seward contended that these high plains were: 
 
part of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed 
upon them by the Creator of the Universe … [on] trust 
to secure in the highest attainable degree of happiness 
[for his stewards].513 
 
Instead of selling these uninhabited lands, the USA government established 
a regime to give away all public land free of charge to parties willing to 
appropriate the land with their own labour.514 Under this scheme, many 
individuals migrated from the east to the west in hopes of appropriating the 
160 acres they were provided.515 According to Greely, this homesteading 
movement was consistent with man’s inherent right to ‘use any portion of 
the earth’s surface not actually in use by another’.516 By granting the early 
settlers the option to buy the land at $1.25 six months later, the 
homesteading movement ensured that the property remained only in the 
hands of private entities most capable of appropriating it.517 For 
extraterrestrial bodies, such as the Moon and other celestial bodies, the 
homesteading movement provides an aspiration to advance human 
settlements into Outer Space unlocking new resources and opportunities. At 
the very least, the homesteading movement establishes that private property 
rights are possible in territory once regarded as ‘communal’. 
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 W H Seward, ‘Freedom in the New Territories’ in Robert C Byrd (ed), The Senate, 
1789–1989: Classic Speeches (Government Printing Office, 1994) 295, 308. 
514  F J Turner, ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History’ (Speech delivered 
at the Proceedings of the State Historical Society in Wisconsin, 14 December 1893). 
515  Hill, above n 512, 197.  
516  R M Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain, 1776–1936 (Princeton 
University Press, 1942).   
517  Hill, above n 512, 197. 
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E Importing a ‘New’ Interpretation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Outer 
Space 
 
While any future developments in the Outer Space legal regime remains a 
matter of political discourse,518 the private law of ‘public trusts’ offers an 
interesting solution for private property rights in Outer Space. Balancing the 
interests of the private entities with the community at large, this system 
proposes a regime where legal title would be vested in the an overarching 
international body to administer private property rights in Outer Space for 
the benefit of mankind as a whole.519 As the trustee or ‘legal owner’ of 
property in Outer Space, these ‘overarching international bodies’ will have 
the obligation to hold the extraterrestrial property ‘on trust’ for the public as 
a whole.520 
 
The modern application of space law in the geostationary orbit, best 
illustrates the current use of the public trust doctrine in Outer Space.521 By 
creating a licensing regime regulated by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the ITU commands the role of a trustee 
permitting the equitable distribution of any benefits which may arise from 
the use of the orbit.522 Satellites appropriate the geostationary orbit slots on 
a first come, first served basis, and all foreign interference in the area is 
‘avoided’.523 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518  Jenks, above n 230, 297. According to renowned space law scholar, Jenks, the 
development of private property rights beyond the ‘facility’ of a space station remains 
a matter best left for political discourse. Cf White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
White contends that the developments of private property rights in Outer Space must 
not be conveniently categorised as a matter for political discourse.  
519  Francis Lyall, ‘The Role of the International Telecommunication Union’ in Gabriel 
Lafferanderie and Daphne Crowther (eds), Outlook on Space Law Over the Next 30 
Years (Martinus Nijhoff, 1997) 253, 255–6; Fountain, above n 345, 1767. Fountain 
discusses in detail the modern applications of space law and the allocation of the 
geostationary orbital slots by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
Unlike treaties, the ITU regulations allowed both the States and private sector to join 
as members. This specialist body has three sectors namely the Radiocommunication 
Sector, The Telecommunication Standardisation Sector and the Telecommunication 
Development Sector.  
520  Fountain, above n 345, 1767. 
521  Ibid 1765–7.  
522  Ibid 1767. 
523  Ibid 1766–7. 
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If translated to Outer Space, the recognition of private entities’ occupation 
of extraterrestrial land by an overarching regulatory body is likely to be 
synonymous with the functional property rights regime advanced by 
White.524 As private entities begin to enact permanent structures in the area, 
this ‘act’ would automatically prohibit other private entities’ from using or 
appropriating the same piece of extraterrestrial land. 525 However, any form 
of property rights accorded by an overarching international body is likely to 
resemble nothing more than a limited right to property.526 If the allocation 
of private property rights in Outer space is premised upon a licensing 
regime, the rights conferred to the private entity would be more 
restrictive.527 Private property may not exist in its true form as private 
entities would only be granted an interest in the land for a stipulated period 
of time and incapable of transferring their beneficiary interests freely in the 
extraterrestrial land to third party, without the prior consent of the 
overarching international body.528  
 
Nevertheless, a key distinction must be drawn between the geostationary 
orbit and extraterrestrial land. While the former is unlikely to become an 
area of human settlement, the latter remains a frontier which private entities 
aim to conquer sometime in the near future.529 If private settlements were to 
ever become possible on extraterrestrial lands such as the Moon and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524  White, Real Property Rights, above n 10. 
525  Ibid.  
526  Gerald R Faulhaber and David J Farber, ‘Spectrum Management: Property Rights, 
Markets, and the Commons’ in Lorrie Faith Cranor and Steven S Wildman (eds), 
Rethinking Rights and Regulations: Institutional Responses to New Communication 
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(eds), Rethinking Rights and Regulations: Institutional Responses to New 
Communication Technologies (MIT Press, 2003) 3. Lafferranderie traces the 
historical developments in space law. Lafferranderie contends that the issue of 
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celestial bodies, the temporary licensing regime simply would not suffice.530 
Some form of fee simple estate, or its equivalent may be necessary for 
private entities to be able to enjoy, use and exploit the property in its 
entirety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 2: Comparison between Grotius’ and Lockean Epistemology of 
Property in Application of the Public Trust Doctrine 
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licensing regime (the CSLA) … will soon prove inadequate as more people venture 
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Hence, the existing public-trust doctrine must be deconstructed and re-
constructed to better balance the interests of the private entities and the 
community at large. Instead of assuming the role of the trustee, the 
international regulatory body or International Property Union (IPU) would 
take on the role of the settlor transferring the ‘legal title’ to the private entity 
to hold it on trust for the ‘benefit of mankind’ (see diagram 2). Under the 
Lockean epistemology, the ‘benefit of mankind’ merely refers to the use of 
labour to ‘increase the common stock of mankind’: 
 
‘[H]e that incloses land, and has a greater plenty of the 
conveniences of life from ten acres, that he could have 
from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give 
ninety acres to mankind.’531 
 
Apart from the added restriction to only appropriate reasonably sized pieces 
of land which is ‘used’ by the private entity,532 the Lockean theory of 
property may provide the closest analogy to replicate the fee-simple estate 
which currently exists on Earth. As Article II of the OST merely prohibits 
national appropriation and not international appropriation,533 it is unlikely 
that the initial vesting of extraterrestrial property rights in the international 
regulatory body would be objected. Hence, this ‘new’ public trust doctrine 
would not only be ideal but robust to meet the changing needs of private 
property rights in Outer Space. More importantly, this regime is likely to 
promote a positive property rights allocation regime that overcomes the 
existing ambiguities in the Outer Space legal regime.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [37].  
532 Ibid [32]–[33]. 
533  Outer Space Treaty art II.  
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VI FINAL WORDS: LET THE SPACE RACE BEGIN!  	  
In the absence of disparaging judicial literature and ambiguous treaty 
provisions, the issue of private property rights remains largely unresolved in 
Outer Space. Falling prey to a plethora of ‘imprecise’ rules and scarce legal 
norms, the existing space law regime leaves a hostile void which must be 
filled before the commercialisation of Outer Space can occur. While it may 
be argued that private property rights may be permissible in the absence of 
any express prohibitions in the existing Outer Space Treaty, this would be a 
weak argument as the application of the ‘residual negative’ principle 
remains highly controversial.  
 
Although the work of publicists promises the ‘richest source’ of law on the 
viability of private property rights in Outer Space, the lack of consensus 
amongst scholars has made the application of the existing legal regime more 
‘obscure’. The wide array of legal arguments advanced in the existing 
literature, re-affirms the unsettling nature of the existing Outer Space legal 
regime, especially the application of the ‘national non-appropriation’ 
principle found in Article II of the OST. While proponents of private 
property rights in Outer Space favour a literal interpretation of the 
provision, opponents look at the OST more holistically to suggest that all 
acts of private entities automatically amount to acts of the State and 
therefore should be prohibited. Amidst the mounting ambiguities, the most 
accurate reflection of private property rights remains that these rights, while 
plausible, may not be legally ‘recognised’ under the existing Outer Space 
regime.  
 
Even if private property rights were to become expressly ‘recognised’ at a 
later date, it remains unlikely that claims for entire extraterrestrial bodies, 
such as the Moon and Mars, may be permitted. Private entities such, as the 
Lunar Embassy, which purport to sell plots of land on the Moon are unlikely 
to confer ownership to third parties, without first asserting some form of 
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possession of the land. Under the functional property rights approach, it 
remains highly unlikely that any one private entity would be granted 
exclusive possession of property more than he or she can reasonably ‘use’. 
  
While the legal regimes governing the other global commons, such as the 
high seas and Antarctica, offer valuable insights into the future 
developments of private property rights in Outer Space, a simple ‘cut’ and 
‘paste’ legal reform remains unlikely in the lex specialis of Space law. 
Dealing predominantly with issues of sovereignty, rather than, private 
property rights, the Antarctic Treaty System offers no assistance for the 
development of private property rights in Outer Space. Similarly, the 
application of UNCLOS would lead to bizarre consequences in Outer Space 
by setting up artificial ‘exclusive economic zones’ where states would be 
able to assert a limited form of sovereignty to regulate the mining activities 
of their nationals.  
 
Unlike the high seas and Antarctica, extraterrestrial bodies, such the Moon 
and Mars are likely to transition into territories housing permanent human 
settlements in the future.534 The private appropriation of property on ‘Earth’ 
serves as the best analogy for future developments in Outer Space. 
Bestowed upon mankind in common,535 the civil law traditions of property 
re-affirms private entities’ innate right to claim property in the absence of 
any overriding State.536 This view is further supported in the Arctic islands 
of Jan Mayen, Spitzbergen and Sverdrup where private property rights came 
into existence well before any form of sovereignty was superimposed onto 
the land. As the existing OST, prohibits ‘national sovereignty’, the Arctic 
islands may offer the best analogy for private property rights in Outer 
Space. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534  Silverman, above n 5; Reynolds and Kopel, above n 236; van Ballegoyen, above n 
263; Murnane, above n 404; Jaurez and Landau, above n 466. 
535  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [26]. 
536  Declaration of the Rights of Man art 17; Gilson, above n 28. According to the Civil 
law, private property remains an inherent right of man and does not derive its validity 
from any sovereign.  
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While Outer Space is predominantly categorised as res communis, or the 
communal property belonging to the ‘common heritage of mankind’, the 
current legal interpretation of the CHM doctrine has the potential to impede 
future developments in Outer Space. The legal interpretations of the CHM 
must evolve, yet again, in the context of the Outer Space property rights 
regime to overcome the logical fallacy of communal property which 
remains the property of everybody’s and yet nobody’s. Appealing to the 
Lockean labour theory of property, it remains likely that Outer Space, like 
Earth, is bestowed upon ‘man in common’ but need not remain so, as 
private entities begin appropriating land in Outer Space: 
 
‘God gave the world to men in common, but since He 
gave it to them for their benefit and the greatest 
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, 
it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain 
common.’537 
 
As the human race multiplies into Outer Space, private entities may begin 
partitioning the ‘shared property of mankind’ and asserting private property 
rights in Outer Space. While these rights are likely to be ‘recognised’ after a 
prolonged period of time, as seen in the Arctic analogies, the chaos and 
uncertainty which the existing Outer Space legal regime introduces remains 
crippling for private entities seeking to appropriate extraterrestrial land and 
resources.  
 
Nevertheless, the future of private property rights in Outer Space rests on 
treacherous grounds. With the express prohibition of State sovereignty and 
no overriding international regulatory body, it remains difficult to establish 
a private property rights regime that remotely resembles the fee-simple 
estate on Earth. In essence, while the enactment of new treaties is best left 
for future political discourse, legal precedents such as the 19th century 
homesteading movement and the ‘public’ trust doctrine serve as a good 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537  Locke, Second Treatise, above n 20, ch 5 [33]. 
	   101	  
starting point for the future administration of private property rights in 
Outer Space.  
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